Obama - Sharif talks: Dog-whistle politics

By Aik Awaz - One Voice

In light of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s second official visit to the US since 2013, the media was abuzz with speculating what the agenda of the meeting would be. With Obama’s decision to retain troops in Afghanistan till 2017, this meeting gained even more significance as the decision meant that the two countries will continue spearheading the fight against terrorism in the region for the foreseeable future. While some experts felt that nuclear escalation in the region and relations with India would form the core of the agenda, others pointed out that a stable Afghanistan would be Obama’s only concern towards the end of his tenure; however, a compilation of ten issues that Obama needs to address published on the Huffington Post really took the cake. Penned by Malik Siraj Akbar, who would more than qualify as an ‘expert’ given his credentials dismally failed to live up to all the accolades he has received as a journalist. While the internet is flooded with articles that criticize just for the sake of criticism and further a certain agenda, this one stood out for the lack of depth and understanding with regards to the very basic issues it raises.

While all of the ten points aren’t worthy of being addressed, a couple them deserve to be countered as they have been circulating in the realm of social media for quite a while. Starting with Pakistan’s complacence when it comes to taking action against outfits such as the LeT, it is as simple as chalking out a strategy and prioritizing according to exceptional circumstances. Pakistan’s armed forces have been deployed in tribal regions to eradicate the networks of al Qaeda and the TTP, and taking into consideration the volatile situation of the region and arrival of ISIS in Afghanistan, the forces will be stationed in the region till at least 2019. Pakistan faces a long-term struggle against terrorism and more importantly against extremism, but Mr. Siraj should be aware of the fact all the militant outfits cannot be dealt with a mere swoosh of the wand.

Mr. Siraj feels that “Obama must urge Sharif to repeal, or at least reform, the infamous blasphemy law, which is mostly used against religious minorities.” Apart from the fact this issue would not even be considered as part of the agenda by the Obama administration, it seems that the author is oblivious to the on-ground realities and widespread extremism in the country. Misuse and exploitation of the law has been a recognized issue before Nawaz Sharif came to power again in 2013, and such reform cannot take place in vacuum unless a shift comes about in the way the Pakistani society views the law. That shift has been taking place gradually though, the recent judgment of the Mumtaz Qadri trial and even more recent statement by the Supreme court stating that calls for improvement of the Blasphemy law are not objectionable point to the fact that small but significant steps are being taken to improve the implementation of the law. 

With regards to the situation in Baluchistan, there has never been any doubt that the Baloch people harbor legitimate grievance. However, there is no denying the fact that external involvement in the province has been a serious obstacle in the path of the Pakistani administration that has attempted to adopt more inclusive measures to address and tackle the prevailing issues in Baluchistan. Moreover, one would wonder why Obama would choose to address this issue, while he chooses to regard the Kashmir issue as an internal one. 

The author also touches upon other issues such as the Cybercrime Bill, sectarian violence, and the ‘return’ of the death penalty. With regards to the cybercrime bill, there have been concerns over the intrusion of privacy and curtailing of dissent; however, President Obama would think twice before raising this issue because of the countless number of fundamental human rights violations that have taken place under the Patriot act (NSA being exposed by Edward Snowden). Moving on to sectarian violence, as mentioned previously, extremism is more of a threat to Pakistan compared to terrorism; precisely because the latter can be curbed using force while the former cannot. Mr. Siraj confidently states, “Sharif, the only politician to run the country for a third term, has made no policies to curb violence and hatred against religious and sectarian minorities nor does it appear on his list of things to do in the future.” It could be the case that the author is unaware of the recent operation that wiped out the top leadership of LeJ recently, or the fact that the federal government last month announced the commencement of an operation in Southern Punjab targeting exclusively sectarian militants. At last, no one claims that military courts are an ideal situation; but taking into account the lack of judicial reform that has taken place, the backlog of pending cases in civilian courts, issues with regards to the witness protection act etc, it is understandable as to why military courts are being considered as an option in such exceptional circumstances. As far as the death penalty is concerned, President Obama would know better than to point a finger towards Pakistan as states such as Connecticut are debating over its merits, and more importantly the simple fact that it is an internal issue. 

Considering the fact that the Huffington Post has an ever-growing active community and was also ranked #1 on the 15 Most Popular Political Sites list by eBizMBA Rank according to traffic in 2012, perhaps it would serve the renowned news aggregator well if more stringent standards were put in to place to prevent the publishing of half-cooked agenda driven write-ups.

The Real Insanity

By Aik Awaz - One Voice

 
Mr Dhruva Jaishankar’s article — The Definition of Insanity is US Af-Pak Strategy — is perfectly in line with the current anti-Pakistan insanity sweeping India. What is amazing is that Foreign Policy published it.

Mr Jaishankar starts by quoting Donald Trump when he calls US leaders stupid and losers. He links this to the top US leader President Obama and his decision to maintain forces upto 9700 US troops in Afghanistan through 2015 and 2016. He does this to make just one point — that the real problem in Afghanistan is not the Taliban — it is the Pakistan Army and the ISI but the stupid US leadership just cannot understand this. Only Mr Jaishankar understands because it is the fully blooded and thoroughly battle hardened Pakistan military that gives him and his compatriots in India the jitters. Mr Obama’s decision is sound and is based on a very clear estimate of the current situation in Afghanistan and the paradigm shift in Pakistan’s strategic direction that leads to convergence of interests between the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

India just cannot accept the new changed realities in Pakistan.  Mr Jaishnkar says lets ‘cut the crap’ and then proceeds to dole out large dollops of pure unadulterated crap. He is doing what many Indians and their sponsored lackeys are doing ever since Pakistan’s economy stabilized, China announced the CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor) as part of its ‘One Belt-One Road’ strategy and Russian-Pakistan relations warmed up — writing madly to malign the Pakistan military, their nemesis-the ISI (Pakistan’s powerful intelligence agency) and Pakistan’s nuclear capability. The fact that the Pakistani Prime Minister is going on a state visit to the US and media reports have suggested that there may be discussion on the possibility of a nuclear agreement with Pakistan has sent the Indians into overdrive. A bevy of retired diplomats and an assortment of so called “freelance writers and researchers” have been activated and pressed into service. It seems that their outpourings are being orchestrated by an Indian-American in a prestigious US think tank in Washington DC. 

Mr Jaishankar tries to backtrack from India’s irresponsible enunciation of a ‘cold start doctrine’ now being called a ‘proactive strategy’ but this is not possible. Neither is it possible to gloss over the fact that India started the nuclear venture in South Asia way back in 1974. Nor can anyone forget that India created and backed the Mukht Bahini in former Bangladesh thereby laying the seeds for terrorism. Pakistan has been reacting in line with its security concerns. This is what has led to Pakistan adopting full spectrum deterrence and a deployment of forces that will defeat any ‘cold, warm or hot start by India — as stated by Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff. The problem is that if India thinks it can use its mad Hindu radicals to stage a false flag event in India and then undertake a ‘punitive strike’ against Pakistan to humiliate its military then India needs to think again. This can go horribly wrong if India’s attack or raid fails or even if it stalemates because the Hindu radicals will want escalation. Or Indian estimates of Pakistani reaction can be way off the mark.

Pakistan is not supporting any Taliban. It is fighting an insurgent movement called the Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TPP) that has been driven out of Pakistan and has sanctuary in Afghanistan. India is sponsoring their activities in Pakistan. With the US and Afghanistan, Pakistan is supporting the stability of Afghanistan and an end to the struggle by the Afghan Taliban. The US understands this and also fully understands Pakistan’s nuclear program and the security measures that are in place. You cannot fight and talk to the Afghan Taliban at the same time — Pakistan knows this even if Mr Dhruva does not. The fact that the US-India Nuclear Agreement gives India the capacity to up its fissile material production through unsafeguarded military facilities is not lost on Pakistan so it has to act in its own interests. A US-Pakistan dialogue on this issue is not a bad idea at all.

Mr Dhruva needs to take his blinkers off and see the reality. His ranting and raving against Pakistan is totally unwarranted. What he should examine is what is happening in his own country — saffron clad war painted cow worshiping Hindu extremists on the rampage under the umbrella of a government that needs their support to survive. An Australian was almost lynched for having the tattoo of a Hindu idol on his leg and backside. A Muslim man was lynched by a crazed mob on the false assumption that he had beef in his fridge. A truck driver has been murdered on the false assumption that he had beef in his truck. A crazed Hindu mob attacked the book launching by Pakistan’s former foreign minister who foolishly decided to launch the book in India. A member of the state assembly in Kashmir attacked and smeared with black ink for criticizing the beef ban. Pro India cricket officials who went to India to revive cricket were attacked and hounded out of Mumbai — why anyone from Pakistan should go to India is beyond comprehension. A state Chief Minister with a 40 year history with Hindu extremists has said that those who want to eat beef should leave India. All this is happening in a country which is the largest beef exporter — India. Surely the extremist Hindus know what happens to the bulls and cows that are exported — they are certainly not treated as fathers and mothers.

TTP's breakup a cause of concern

ZoneAsia-Pk

Pakistan’s on-going war against terrorism – the final push – has so far claimed more than 910 militants in North Waziristan and decimated hundreds of militant camps. When Operation Zarb-e-Azb was launched, defence analysts from across the board exhorted the government to take a hands-on approach and work with the Army to develop a multi-pronged strategy to defeat extremism, separate from terrorism, but as big a threat as the latter.

Yet the government initially appeared not only reluctant to endorse a boots-on-the-ground approach but also quickly became sucked into a political imbroglio that shifted the entire country’s attention away from North Waziristan and the internally displaced persons in Bannu, to the Capital. Efforts to engage all state institutions in a political drama only served to exacerbate the government’s own position and paved the path for deep-state to raise eyebrows over the government’s legitimacy.

In the backdrop of the on-going military operation, a national political crisis, regional politics immersed in Machiavellian histrionics and the international security situation held hostage by the Islamic State, a breakaway faction of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan announced itself as the true vanguard that would bring Shariah to Pakistan.

Many quarters have felt that the formation of Jamatul Ahrar signifies a victory of sorts – Pakistan’s largest militant threat developing defections from within shows weakness and a dissonance that can allow the Army and government to end the TTP question once and for all. Fragmentation can only mean smaller weaker targets, easy to take out. The first sign of defeat for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was when it broke into factions, maybe the stratagems that ended Sri Lanka’s 30-year-old war could also put an end to militancy in Pakistan.

However, this needs to be examined in a larger context and it might just be too soon to bring out the champagne.

The TTP claims a certain a ideology. Their’s is a war to reassert orthodox Islamic values in their own vein of interpretation. The seed of war here stems not from social injustice, a sense of deprivation or against foreign occupation – the seed is an idea. When the government decided to hold talks with the TTP, there was an outcry from within TTP structures that believed that there could no compromise on ideas – that would be compromising divine mandate.

It was in the midst of these talks that dissenting groups from within the TTP held attacks under the banner of Ahrarul Hind to jeapordise negotiations. The bombing of a district sessions court in Islamabad and the decapitation of Pakistan Army soldiers was their handiwork. Brutal at best, one could compare their line of ideology and strategy with the IS. The only difference was that all factions claimed allegiance to Mullah Omar, head of the Afghan Taliban under the Al-Qaeda umbrella.

The Jamat, with all the media-savyness of former TTP spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan, claims the support of 70 to 80 TTP commanders. In an hour and a half long video, Maulana Qasim Khorasani (former TTP commander of Mohmand Agency chapter and inline to succeed Hekimullah Mehsud) announces that the TTP has fallen prey to self-seeking individuals (cue Mullah Fazalullah and all the commanders who pushed for talks). Their war is to build a global Caliphate and they will start from Pakistan. The group demonstrates no qualms about violence, they justify it through religion.

Ehsan, in a statement released last week, mentioned that while they were allied with the Afghan Taliban, the IS provided a good example as to how they planned to operate.

This should not serve to alleviate fears regarding militancy in Pakistan, this should serve to alarm. The group is headed by emir Maulana Qasim Khorasani, and Ihsan is its spokesman. Jamaat-ul-Ahrar’s shura, or executive council, includes: Omar Khalid al Khorasani, the powerful commander from Mohmand; Mansoor Nazim Shura and Maulana Haidar from Arakzai; Maulana Adbullah from Bajaur; Qari Ismail from Khyber; Qari Shakil Haqqani from Charsadda; Mufti Misbah from Peshawar; and Maulana Yasin from Swat. The Jamat includes Taliban factions from the tribal agencies of Mohmand, Bajaur, Khyber, and Arakzai, and the districts of Charsadda, Peshawar, and Swat.

By providing these groups an alternative to peace talks, we see the emergence of a new umbrella organisation, seemingly as big as the TTP if not bigger (if Ehsan is to be believed). The group claims that it will stop at nothing to achieve it’s goal of Islamic dominance in the world and they were willing to sacrifice for it.

This leaves the government with no excuse. The Pakistan National Security Council needs to come into action and develop a strategy to deal with new emerging threats. What with the announcement of an Al-Qaeda wing in India, these threats cannot be taken lightly. In a region where physical borders are more than just porous, collective action by the governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India is the need of the hour. There is no question of complacency here.

In a State of War

By FOR PAKISTAN

Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan is the kinetic portion of a counter-terrorism operation being carried out by the security forces in all parts of the country – while the nation rushes to help hundreds of thousands of tribesmen displaced by the newest phase of this almost-decade-long conflict, the Pakistani public needs to be fully aware of their responsibilities to the IDPs as well as their duty to the nation and the state by becoming intelligent and aware human beings who can identify the despicable enemy within…

Pakistan is in a state of war. Make no mistake about it. Terrorist attacks that occurred on an almost-daily basis (sometimes multiple times at multiple locations in a single day) which have significantly abated, and military operations on a limited scale in areas under the control of – or vulnerable to – militancy and terror groups are not random events that cannot be tied together with a single string of ideas: and yes, this string does not need to have a basis in the logic that “this is not our war; it was forced on us because of American intervention in Afghanistan; we should have maintained a policy of non-interference; we turned our back on our Muslim brothers” and so on. Pakistan is in a state of war: and it has been in a state of war since 2004. Though undeclared and unannounced, the tit-for-tat between militants and the military can only be accurately understood and correctly interpreted – by experts as well as by the general public – if we accept and acknowledge that we have been at war with a dastardly and despicable enemy for almost a decade now.

Though Pakistan has been fighting an undeclared – since until some months ago, un-owned – war since 2004, when terror attacks first started occurring in Pakistan in the form of bomb blasts, this war came to our doorstep in full force during 2007: the events and the aftermath of the Lal Masjid siege laid the groundwork for taking the (militants’) war against Pakistan (and the military’s war for Pakistan) to the next level. Between 2007 and 2013, the war cost Pakistan more than any other country in the entire world when measured in terms of infrastructure damage and loss of life. Pakistan still mourns more than 50,000 dead citizens and law enforcement officials (including soldiers and policemen), and the damage to the national economy has been estimated at over US$ 100 billion.

Concentrated military operations took place in the tribal agencies at various points in time between 2007 and 2010, and then the most significant counter-terror operation took place in the South Waziristan tribal agency (2009) and in the settled area of Swat (twice in 2009 alone). Alongside these major operations that were led by the Pakistan Army, other operations by the military, paramilitary, and intelligence agencies – as well as routine operations by civilian law enforcement agencies and police forces – have continued to take place over time: one may imagine that they have only increased and, with the promulgation of the Protection of Pakistan Bill, will have a significant impact in terms of actually bringing terrorists, criminals and anti-state elements to justice.

OPERATION ZARB-E-AZB: TAKING THE FIGHT TO THE TTP

Since mid-June, a full-fledged kinetic operation has been launched by the Army and Air Force in the tribal agency that was considered to be the “hub” or “command center” of the TTP terrorist organization, where it had taken control of many areas and established bases, weapons depots, training centers, and “troop concentration” areas where many foreign militants were also hiding. The operation was launched after continued efforts by the incumbent government to reach a negotiated peace with the TTP failed – and continued to cost Pakistan heavily and dearly as the security forces maintained a ceasefire while TTP elements and cadres continued to attack state and society – and according to Pakistan’s own timetable: it is no secret that among America’s “do more” list for Pakistan, a military operation in North Waziristan (particularly against the “Haqqani network” that operates against U.S., NATO and Afghan forces with devastating impact) was on the top for many years.

THE WAR ALL OVER PAKISTAN: THE CRITICAL STATUS OF KARACHI

Before the kinetic military operation was launched in North Waziristan, a quasi-military (police action led by the paramilitary Rangers force) had been launched in Karachi – and in other parts of Sindh – since late 2013 to combat increased terrorist and criminal activities in Karachi which had continued to rise since 2009-10; multiple attacks and criminal/terror activities were reported in the city on a daily basis for the past few years, resulting in elevated security levels that have been maintained since then (and only enhanced by the incumbent government after it came into power in May 2013). Though covert and strictly secretive in nature, a full-fledged operation against terrorism, militancy, extortion, and serious criminal activities is taking place in Karachi since the new PML-N government took office in 2013: ostensibly, this operation has the support of the PPP – which was in the federal government until 2013, but continues to govern the Sindh province, while the MQM (the PPP’s sometimes-ally-sometimes-adversary) alleges that the operation is designed to target MQM workers and party cadres. Despite a serious attempt – or increased seriousness in the attempt – to secure Karachi and stabilize the economic hub and financial capital of Pakistan, serious loopholes in the security apparatus of the city (particularly the civilian security institutions) continue to raise eyebrows. Senior police positions at the Additional Inspector General (AIG) and Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) still remain vacant in Karachi, though thankfully, the position of Inspector General (IG) of Sindh Police has recently been filled on a full-time basis. Many continue to ask: who is responsible for the continued uncertainty – and resultant instability – of these senior police positions remaining vacant in the interim period? Is the Government of Sindh or the Interior Ministry in Islamabad to blame? To be more precise: is the trust deficit between the PPP and the PML-N (or fears of the military) to blame? Did the previous government not launch an operation of this scale and magnitude in Karachi due to political expediency, since its major political power base in is Sindh if not Karachi? Did it not want to ruffle the feathers of its then-political ally, the MQM, which “controls” the political outcomes in Karachi, whether it is an electoral exercise or a political activity? These questions still require definite and cogent answers, even as the Supreme Court continues its hearing on a suo moto case regarding Karachi’s security: a case whose previous judgments declared that political parties maintain militant wings in the city, and a case whose hearings still continue despite two Chief Justices (by cause of superannuation) having retired since the case started.

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES: NO DEARTH OF HEROES

A trend of terror attacks in Karachi that has picked up pace and has become more frequent is one where security forces’ officials – particularly those of the police – are being targeted in Karachi. To those who have been studying the case of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Pakistan, similarities can definitely be drawn with terrorist operations in Peshawar in yesteryears, when at least two senior and extremely important security officials – Peshawar’s Capital City Police Officer (CCPO), Malik Saad, and Inspector General of the Frontier Corps (IGFC) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Safwat Ghayur – were assassinated by militants after being continually targeted in various attempts. These are but two among many brave and valiant security officials to whom the people of Peshawar and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in particular – and the people of Pakistan as a whole – will always remain indebted, since they were the first and last line of defence between the TTP and its terrorist affiliates taking over a major urban city in the KP province adjoining the FATA tribal agencies. Karachi’s CID chief, Chaudhry Aslam, was targeted multiple times, and was eventually martyred by a bomb attack on January 09, 2014: again, he is one of many security officials serving in Sindh who laid down their lives in the fight against terrorism and terrorists. The Pakistani nation continues to be indebted to these heroes, and knows that the nation’s security forces have such shining examples which will continue to serve as beacons of excellence and models of what a protector of the nation and the people is like. Though Pakistan has lost these brave men to the dastardly attacks of terrorists and to the immortal embrace of martyrdom, there are still many more experienced, capable, competent and valiant professionals who continue to serve in the civilian security forces, the paramilitary and the military: it is because of them that Pakistan continues to exist as a viable nation-state whose existence can be sustained and will be perpetuated for the years to come.

NATIONWIDE SECURITY ALERT: TWO PERSPECTIVES

Since the start of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, a nationwide security alert is in place. The operation’s casus belli (reason for initiation) is considered to be the attack on the Karachi airport, which was an assault conducted by Uzbek militants who were sheltered and trained by the TTP. Security of all airports throughout the country has been strengthened, with multiple layers and rings of protection established around airport perimeters. Nevertheless, Karachi continues to be a volatile security flashpoint: even as late as July 2013, police officials and Rangers paramilitary forces were targeted by gunmen as well as shot at when they conducted search operations in volatile areas of Karachi, like Lyari, Sohrab Goth, and Katti Pahari, among others. And the above-stated trend also continues: CCTV footage released recently showed that terrorists on a motorbike deliberately targeted a police official in uniform as he was riding his own motorbike in front of them (and unaware that terrorists were behind him and about to shoot him): the first few shots resulted in the police official’s motorbike going out of control, skidding, and coming to a halt near the curb of the street. The terrorists on the motorbike followed suit: they rode up to the policeman in distress, and the terrorist with the gun got off to shoot the policeman at point-blank range in execution style. The CCTV footage ends by showing that the terrorists took the policeman’s sidearm weapon (and/or some other article) from his dead or dying body, and then making their escape on the motorbike. There are two ways of interpreting this: terrorists have now increased their targeting of security forces personnel – especially when the latter are least expecting it – in order to lower the morale of the public (who cannot expect to be safe if their guardians, the police and law enforcement officers, are so vulnerable to terrorists) as well as law enforcement agencies (who would have to take added measures to protect themselves from terrorists, and would thus deviate from their original responsibility of protecting the people, and by doing so, would create additional hindrances in effective and timely communication between the citizenry and law enforcement agencies). The other way of interpreting this is that because of the ongoing security operation in Karachi, which has many dimensions (counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, counter-intelligence, crime reduction, restoration of law and order), the terrorists are losing their ground in the city: their cadres and cells, their support from political parties and external intelligence agencies, and most importantly, their sources of weapons and financing (such as theft, robbery, gun-running, narcotics peddling, and recently extortion, which has become a cancer for the city and a bane for its financial elite) are becoming scarce, so they are making last-ditch efforts to revive their strength and importance in the city by targeting those forcing which have systematically eroded these capabilities of all anti-state and anti-social elements (from petty criminals, to miscreants and criminal gangs, to terrorists and terrorist financiers who are linked with organizations like the TTP and therefore are part of national as well as trans-national criminal/terrorist networks).

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN POLITICAL SUPPORT AND PUBLIC SUPPORT

Despite its allegations that the ongoing (kinetic but low-intensity) operation in Karachi is designed to target and eliminate its workers – and its “electoral strength” in the city – the MQM held a rally in favour of the Pakistan Army and to express its solidarity with the ongoing military operation in North Waziristan on July 06, 2014: the event brought together political parties like the PML-N and the APML (led by incumbent Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and his arch nemesis of late, former President Pervez Musharraf, respectively). Though all parties were ostensibly invited to the event so that they may, in unison and with unanimity, express solidarity with the Armed Forces, the PTI did not attend and did not send any of its members or a delegation to this political show of support for the ongoing military operation. In a scenario where almost all political parties shed their acrimony towards one another and came together for a national cause (for the sake of appearances if nothing else), the PTI still found an excuse to not partake in the rally – not that its support for the military, or Operation Zarb-e-Azb, or its efforts to shelter the IDPs are to be measured by the number of party members that it would have sent. In a national talk show, a PTI legislator said that the party was not “properly invited” to the rally – one wonders why (and how) all other national and provincial parties made it to the widely publicized event through “improper invitations” from the MQM.

In order to truly exhibit political maturity and express solidarity with a national cause and an intensive effort to consolidate national interest, the representatives of the people need to rise up and get out of their shell(s) of insecurity and self-interest that binds them to the basics of political survival: if these characteristics cannot be displayed by parties that operate and get elected at a national level, then any military operation in a specific area will not be successful because in its aftermath, the country’s civilian leadership will be ill-equipped (and frankly, not concerned) with winning the hearts and minds of Pakistan’s tribal citizens who have long been neglected and deprived, and who have been suffering for decades so that their fellow citizens in other cities and provinces can enjoy relative security and the benefits of economic development (no matter how miniscule they are). And – this goes without saying – regardless of whom one voted for, and regardless of whether a political party joins a rally in support and solidarity of the Armed Forces or not, the entire nation is grateful of the services and sacrifices rendered by the brave men and women who wear the uniform of the Pakistani security forces: the people of Pakistan do not need to attend a rally or shout slogans to show the Pakistan Army (or anyone else, for that matter) that their soldiers are our heroes; that the people are cognizant of the fact that the Army has been holding the nation together and keeping the state intact by denying terrorists the space and capability to turn Pakistan into a failed state; that our brave and valiant soldiers are not only loved and cherished, but also immortal in the ultimate sacrifice that they present in the service of the nation and for the protection of the people. Without a shadow of a doubt, they acquire the exalted status of immortal martyrs by giving their lives for the people of Pakistan: and the people of Pakistan are least ungrateful of such an enormous sacrifice, for the martyrs of Pakistan live on forever in the hearts of the people. Such is the power of public support (and its eminence over political support) and such is the bond that the people of Pakistan – especially true patriots – have with the brave men and women, soldiers and officers of the Armed Forces and all of Pakistan’s security forces: the fearless defenders of the motherland, whose doctrine is that “it is better to live for something than to die for nothing”.

THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT’S CAPACITY AND THE NATION’S CAPABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

The Pakistan Army has carried out offensive operations in limited areas within the country’s territorial confines to clear specific areas and eliminate militants and terrorist strongholds from those areas: if the nation-wide structure and apparatus of terrorism is to be eliminated from its roots, then a nation-wide military operation is required. This is why Pakistan has been in a state of war for almost a decade now – a low-intensity conflict gathering momentum and transforming into medium-intensity intensity warfare in the settled urban areas where highly protected sensitive installations of the government and military are attacked by militants. But the nation-wide war has not been launched by the military precisely because of the dearth of effective, capable and altruistic civilian leadership at the helm of government: the military can only “clear” and “hold” vulnerable areas, while the civilian government (and the public) has to take over governance of the area and manage the “build” as well as “transfer” phases of a counter-insurgency operation. Redevelopment of a warzone should be the primary priority once the military objectives are achieved so that displaced residents can be resettled and basic infrastructure restored (and improved) to serve their needs. Complete transfer of authority – particularly the policing of the area with improved protocols and heightened alert levels – can only take place if state institutions (and officials of the state and government) are capable enough to exercise and perpetuate the writ of the state that is re-established in the area(s) successfully cleared by the military.

If the incapacity of elected civilian governments at the federal and provincial levels is a sad reality in Pakistan, it must not be allowed to dampen the spirit of the Pakistani people, who can rebuild what is destroyed through sheer will and determination: after countless natural calamities and man-made disasters that Pakistan has suffered, it is the indomitable will of the people that prevails and perseveres, and it is the rock-solid foundation of the country’s existence. Anything built on top of it can be rebuilt if destroyed, and it can be improved if it is not effective. The people of Pakistan must not only support the military by chanting slogans and holding rallies: the citizenry must undertake their civic responsibilities – enormous as they are – towards the nation and towards their fellow countrymen by rebuilding what is lost or destroyed, and by undertaking a soul-searching, introspective national discourse on whether radicalism, fundamentalism and militancy in the name of religious purification should be allowed in Pakistan, or whether it should be holistically eliminated and surgically eradicated from every nook and corner of the vast homeland of Punjabis, Sindhis, Baluch, Pashtuns, Hazara, Gilgitis, Kashmiris, Seraiki, and so many other ethnicities and linguistic groupings who profess to be Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, Parsis, and various other creeds and denominations. Celebrating unity in Pakistan’s rich diversity will not only serve to include the long-neglected tribal brethren into the national mainstream, but will also help in the idea of Pakistan – and the reality of Pakistan – winning the hearts and minds of disenchanted Muslims as well as radicalized Islamists, who would be incentivized to shun their regressive beliefs and actions in favour of a modern, progressive, inclusive and development-oriented approach that will take Pakistan and all Pakistanis to the heights of greatness, prominence and eminence among the comity of nations. Without a doubt, that is Pakistan’s destiny, and any diversion from the path of this goal is a short-lived hindrance, not an “existential threat” as many would believe. This nation, founded by the ideals of a philosopher poet and the efforts of a renowned, respected and acclaimed lawyer, has yet to realize its true potential: once the people of Pakistan unite in service of a common cause, there is nothing that can hold them back. History has proved this again and again, from the birth of Pakistan till today, and if the citizens of Pakistan realize their common national purpose and their civic duty to the nation-state, the future holds infinite opportunities and boundless hope for progress and improvement so that one day, Pakistanis will hold their heads high among other nationalities and proudly say, “I am Pakistani”.

DEFEATING THE TERRORISTS: THE ROLE OF PAKISTANI CITIZENS IN OPERATION ZARB-E-AZB

Today, the general public is the most important source of intelligence and counter-terrorism information since they have the potential of becoming the eyes and ears of security forces – particularly in the urban environment, where terrorists can easily gel into the crowd, form sleeper cells, obtain refuge, and even undertake criminal activities to sustain the cell or evolve into a larger anti-state organization. Since the public forms the core component of the community, they are able to notice changes and anomalies within their home environment and local community more easily than security forces are able to. It is, therefore, the responsibility of the people of Pakistan to play their role in securing their communities and cities: by no means does this include taking the law into one’s own hands. Citizens must become more aware and more cognizant of their surroundings; they must maintain regular contact and communication with other members of their community and society, as well as with those officials of law enforcing agencies who are deputed to protect and secure them and the areas in which they live. Any anomaly or perceived changes must be studied closely and carefully; while there could be cases of false alarms, time and again it has been proven – also in Pakistan – that timely information from responsible citizens and effective policing efforts by local law enforcement (without giving suspected terrorists and miscreants time to adapt, retreat, or respond/retaliate) have resulted in successful prevention of acts of terror that – if they were to take place – would have resulted in the deaths of many Pakistanis, and injuries (sometimes fatal, other times life-changing) to many others. To do this, the people of Pakistan must overcome the perpetual trust deficit that exists between the public and the police: recognizing this deficit, security forces – particularly the Army – has set up special counter-terror information hotlines in major cities, so that information from citizens in the community may be passed directly to the relevant intelligence agency, and so that the police responds in an effective and supportive fashion rather than relegating actionable intelligence items and/or critical threats to a lower level of importance: to the detriment of not only the general public that bears the brunt of terror attacks, but also that of the integrity and operational effectiveness of the police force.

State and society must work together to eliminate criminals, terrorists and anti-state elements who pose a clear and dangerous threat to peace, public security, the lives and properties of Pakistani citizens, and to the state of Pakistan and its writ over the country’s territory. Society needs to overcome the psychological obstacles which prevent them from being an active part of public policing – an activity where the community helps local police and law enforcement maintain a vigilant eye on the neighbourhood and act preemptively to apprehend suspects and prevent them from disguising themselves as members of the community (before they plan and undertake their planned terrorist activities). In case the threat is of a continuing nature, such as criminal elements threatening the public through threats, display of weaponry, extortion demands, etc. then police and law enforcement agencies must be involved at the very first instance, so that these elements can be completely rooted out. The same goes for drug dealers and narcotics peddlers, since they form an integral part of a supply chain that yields financial benefits for terrorist insurgents (leaders as well as sleeper cells organized in various urban centers and settled areas): sometimes, terrorists themselves sell narcotics in order to acquire funds for implementing their plans and strategies designed to disturb public peace and wreak havoc and mayhem on society as well as the state.

Only by joining hands and consolidating forces can this ignominious threat be overcome: otherwise the ongoing operation and related counter-terrorism activities – including the promulgation of the Protection of Pakistan Bill – will be useless. The people of Pakistan must truly and wholeheartedly be “on board” with the state and security forces, and fight the menace of terrorism, extremism, intolerance, militancy and fundamentalism with the founding pillars of this great country: unity, faith, and discipline.

Help the Government of Pakistan and the Armed Forces: call 1135 to report any suspicious activity

STILL FLAWED: The Afghan Elections, and The Afghan State

Tacstrat Analysis

After the underdog Ashraf Ghani emerges as President-elect of Afghanistan with 56% of the vote in a ballot whose result is contested by Abdullah Abdullah, who won the most number of votes in the first stage of the election. Will Ghani succeed where Karzai failed, and cobble up a coalition that includes opponents and critics, from the insurgents to political adversaries, including Abdullah Abdullah himself? Or is the latest twist in the tale of the Afghan state going to add to problems? The Taliban are gearing up for the “fighting season” in a year when most NATO troops will withdraw, and Pakistan is conducting counter-terror operations in North Waziristan: will Afghan politics undo all the work that has been done – and is still being done – so far to stabilize the region?

The current political crisis in Afghanistan is not a good omen. It does not bode well for Afghanistan’s security or its future: and it will have negative repercussions for the stability of the entire region.

The main issue that gives credence to the charges of rigging and electoral tampering are the results of first round of balloting held on April 05 – Abdullah Abdullah (who also contested the 2009 presidential election, and is the candidate of the National Coalition of Afghanistan) got more votes than Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai: the former had 45% of the vote while the latter had 31.5%! How did number two jump to number one in the second round (or run-off) held on June 14, where the leader from the first phase was expected to get more votes and consolidate his lead (which was only a few percentage points away from the required 50% of the vote)? Is it really possible that Ashraf Ghani got more than double the votes that he did in the first phase of the election (2,084,547 votes in the first round and 4,485,888 in the second, ending up with 56.44% of the vote) – and on top of that, is it believable that he was lagging at least ten percentage points behind Abdullah Abdullah, and then managed to close in the gap and exceed it within a matter of weeks? Abdullah Abdullah (who got 2,972,141 votes in the first round and 3,461,639 in the second: an increase of 16%, but bringing down his overall lead from 45% to 43.56%) had been campaigning against the election rigging ever since the first round ended, and protests are already taking place in different cities of Afghanistan; he had given proof in mid-June that the Afghan IEC was “colluding” with Ghani and his team, and were using illegal methods to obtain a result favourable for Ghani. He rejected the results of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) well before they were announced on July 07 (delayed from their original date of announcement on July 02), and continues to boycott the election process until his allegations are taken seriously and the real results of the election are announced. Abdullah Abdullah’s main allegation is that “ballot-stuffing” – filling ballot boxes with illegal votes that would eventually be counted and considered legitimate – has resulted in the victory of his opponent. The final result of the 2014 presidential election is expected to be announced on July 22.

“Ballot-stuffing” is among the main reasons (along with electoral fraud and intimidation) that made the 2009 presidential election controversial: heavy U.S. pressure resulted in the announcement of a second round, but the main contestant at that time (Abdullah Abdullah) declined to participate, resulting in President Hamid Karzai winning a second term in office. Mr. Abdullah was a former Foreign Minister of Afghanistan under the Karzai regime, and Mr. Ghani also served as Finance Minister under President Karzai. Most of the presidential contenders in 2014 had served in the Karzai cabinet or in the post-2001 Afghan state in different positions. Even in 2009, Mr. Abdullah called for the resignation of the IEC chief; his demand was rejected by the incumbent President, Hamid Karzai. Mr. Abdullah’s refusal to participate in the scheduled second run-off led to the cancellation of the second round and the declaration of Karzai as the winner of the election. It is unlikely that Mr. Abdullah would bow out this time again, leading to a more prolonged political crisis than what was witnessed five years ago (he recently told a crowd of supporters chanting “death to Ashraf Ghani” that “we will not accept a fraudulent result – not today, not tomorrow, never”). And since the Afghan people are already out on the streets demanding transparency and accurate counting of legitimate votes, it is also unlikely that the Election Complaints Commission (backed by the UN in 2009) will deliver timely verdicts that would please Mr. Abdullah this time around. In 2009, under intense pressure from the U.S. (which wanted to show that together, Mr. Karzai and Mr. Abdullah won 70% of the vote, making a consensus government in which they both shared power a legitimate one that represented a majority of the Afghan electorate) both candidates refused to discuss power sharing with other contestants or declare the results to be valid before they were announced (and/or a winner was declared). U.S. diplomat Peter Galbraith – who openly accused his superior, UN representative Kai Eide, of covering up massive electoral fraud in favour of Karzai – called the 2009 Afghan presidential elections a “train wreck”, stating that in his estimate, more than 30% of votes cast for Karzai were “fraudulent”.

The impact of the current political crisis on security operations is immense and will continue to increase: one must not forget how difficult it was to secure the initial elections phase, held in a single countrywide ballot on April 05.

The 2009 Afghan presidential election, as well as the results of the elections held this year, speak for themselves: how can such a huge statistical anomaly be relegated to the ranks of a real but inexplicable phenomenon? It is either real, and then should be explainable, or it is a manipulated outcome, and must therefore be cleansed and made more transparent. The future of Afghanistan, and the stability of the region, is at stake.

Of particular importance is Pakistan’s operation in North Waziristan: in addition to targeting TTP militants and foreign fighters (Uzbeks, Chechens, Uighurs, and others) the Pakistani military is also going against the Haqqani network, which had long been presumed to have been enjoying Pakistani protection and patronage, and which has been the main force of the Taliban insurgency since 2005. Since June, Pak-Afghan diplomacy and military relations appear to be improving, at least in terms of frequency of contact.

But the value added by recent diplomatic efforts in terms of securing both Pakistan and Afghanistan – disrupting and dismantling terrorist networks, including their leadership, and eliminating terrorist groups and anti-state forces from a position of strength – will only be seen for its true contribution after the current military operation in Pakistan is over.

Pakistan has already initiated a nationwide security alert, and the security at airports and other sensitive and important places has been heightened. Search operations take place in different settled areas of the country, including Karachi, to flush out TTP operatives who have fled, or sleeper cells who might organize and carry out reprisal attacks deep within Pakistan. As Pakistan is already host to a large number of Afghan immigrants – many of whom were to migrate back to their home country this year after decades of staying in Pakistan – the current military operation in the area bordering Afghanistan, along with the Afghan political crisis (that may affect the country’s security and ongoing fight against the Taliban in a negative way) would lead many Afghans to consider that another period of unrest, civil war, ethnic tensions and internecine infighting is soon to follow: it may result in a Taliban “re-takeover” or would lead to continued conflict between the state and insurgent elements.

According to news reports (and claims by the Abdullah campaign), U.S. President Barack Obama phoned Abdullah Abdullah to “calm down ragged nerves” on July 07 and then called Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai on July 08. He called for a thorough review of allegations of electoral fraud: while the U.S. President said that the results were not final, he also “warned” Abdullah Abdullah against declaring victory before the final results were announced, or to make attempts for a “power grab”. Should it be considered direct American intervention in Afghanistan’s sovereign affairs, and continuing intervention at that (given the scenario that occurred in 2009)? The White House said that the U.S. President was also “threatening” to cut off U.S. aid to Afghanistan if “violent or extra-constitutional” means are used to take power or to disrupt the political process. Gopal Ratnam and Eltaf Najafizada, writing for “Bloomberg”, say that the U.S. risks being blamed for taking sides if it involves itself further in the Afghan election process: particularly if it increases its involvement to the levels of 2009.

The Afghan state is flawed. The abovementioned arguments leave no doubt about that – and even if it isn’t flawed, wishful thinking requires some verification from facts on the ground. These ground realities reveal that the Taliban are making moves to take over the Sangin area in Helmand province, and holding their positions despite repeated counter-attacks from Afghan security forces since mid-June. The state, when measured in terms of its political sustainability, legitimacy, viability, and capability of securing itself and establishing its writ, is crumbling fast if it has not completely failed yet.

In the dying days of his second term of office, President Karzai still wishes to manipulate the state’s processes and maximize his existing political capital by pulling the strings: thereby making the current electoral process as controversial as the elections of 2009. Nothing can be done if the Afghan government – or if Afghans themselves – are bent on sabotaging their own political process(es).

The process itself is flawed too. The Afghan IEC isn’t really independent: it depends on the Afghan president and the incumbent government for its human resource and finances more so than the Afghan parliament or an independent state institution like the judiciary (which, again, is an extension of the executive branch rather than being a separate arm of the state). The trichotomy of powers is non-existent in how the Afghan state operates, and the executive – particularly the President – holds almost absolute power when it comes to developing and implementing national policies.

As such, the will of the Afghan people may be represented through a democratic process that is limited and has not developed enough to account holistically for the will of the Afghan people expressed through voting and exercising public franchise. It is not even certain to what extent the existing state apparatus recognizes the local culture, customs, and traditional tribal leadership of Afghan communities – and whether they are given official status in the process of exercising decision-making power, or not. In turn, this means that the real representation of the democratic mandate of any Afghan president – whether he comes to power through a transparent and legitimate process or not, and regardless of how much power or influence he is able to exercise – is limited itself. Marginalized communities and ethnic groups will continue to feel ignored, neglected and deprived of their role in society; similarly, marginalized power bases will continue their struggle against the status quo and against a sociopolitical order that does not recognize them or serve their purpose.

What is the end result? Afghanistan is still unstable, its state and political processes – particularly the effort of managing the exercise of public franchise to choose their leadership – are unreliable and still have not matured yet. International forces are already pulling out, and will withdraw by the end of this year. The U.S. is planning to keep approximately ten thousand (9,600 to be exact) troops in Afghanistan (to be pulled out by 2017 in favour of a more nominal number) of “military advisers” who will train Afghan troops and policemen, rather than be involved in operations themselves. Both candidates were in favour of the U.S.-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) that had been voted for by the Afghan parliament, and which governs the legal status of U.S. troops stationed in Afghanistan. While President Karzai refused to assent to the law, the BSA would have been inked no matter which of the candidates won: and by appearances, Ashraf Ghani would sign it into law as a priority agenda item, since he was involved in the negotiations that resulted in the BSA in its current form and language.

But the doors of regional intervention in Afghanistan remain open: hence, Afghan stability remains dependent on the foreign policy configurations of Pakistan, India, Iran, Central Asian states, and even China and Russia, who intend to play a more assertive role in Asia (especially through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, or SCO). An Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process is futile if one of the main contenders challenges the very foundations of the Afghan-managed and Afghan-run presidential election process. Peace in Afghanistan – especially peace once foreign troops exit – will only come about through a national coalition government that is truly representative of all shades of public opinion (and all power centers and configurations, including insurgent forces) and that can effectively deliver essential services to the Afghan people. If the Taliban and other nationalist insurgent forces are not on the negotiating table, then all attempts at securing Afghanistan through political dialogue are meaningless. Compared to Pakistan, political dialogue in the truest and most real sense will deliver more sustainable results for Afghanistan than a military operation against Taliban insurgents: the TTP insurgency – which pledges fealty to Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar – was relatively new, and did not recognize the Pakistani Constitution, so attempts to negotiate even a lasting ceasefire were futile, and only counter-insurgency operations could actually dislodge the TTP from holding tribal or settled areas, as the Pakistani military has proved time and again since 2008. It is also important for Afghanistan to force effective military coordination mechanisms and systems with Pakistan so that the joint threat of Taliban militancy can be countered together and either eliminated, or transformed into mainstream political activity that does not threaten public security or defy the writ of the state.

At the same time, too much involvement in Afghanistan’s internal affairs – and that too, in a direct and overt fashion – will be severely disliked by the Afghan populace. Afghan citizens routinely take out anti-Pakistan rallies (obviously encouraged by the Afghan state, the Karzai regime, and the intelligence establishment run by the NDS) to lambast the country’s support in the creation of the Taliban and their rise to power from 1994 to 2001: at times, the rallies are used to raise allegations about Pakistan’s continued financial and operational support to the Taliban, which has been fighting U.S.-led NATO-ISAF forces as well as the Afghan security forces since 2005. As India intends to enlarge its footprint in Afghanistan (after signing a Strategic pact with the Karzai government) while the U.S. intends to prolong its own footprint in the landlocked, mineral-rich country, other regional and global powers will definitely find ways and means to further their interests in the Central and South Asian regions that are connected to each other by Afghanistan. The Persian Gulf is also a region that would be directly affected by an upsurge in the Afghan conflict: Iran borders Afghanistan to the south, and is already concerned about the rise of the “Islamic State” in Iraq and Syria (the acquisition by this radical transnational militant group of weapons, power, territory, oil fields, and their establishment of a “caliphate” in the areas that they continue to control). The Taliban themselves have taken up arms against the fact that foreign troops composed of the U.S. and NATO countries are enforcing security in Afghanistan: the Taliban narrative calls the International Security Assistance Forces “occupiers” and “invaders” in the presence of whom peace can never be restored in Afghanistan.

Countries in the region – and around the world – need to get involved in order to sooth nerves in the Afghan political spectrum, especially because the very stability and future security of Afghanistan (particularly the Afghan state) depends on it. The efforts of Afghanistan’s neighbours and the international community at forging out a consensus Afghan government that is stable and that represents the will of the Afghan people through a transparent electoral process must be designed to encourage Afghanistan at improving its own systems, rather than enforcing decisions or dictating terms to the incumbent Afghan administration. But Afghans themselves need to realize that they must come together and achieve a political consensus that reaches out to all parties, religious groups, ethnicities and associations in all provinces.