TTP's breakup a cause of concern

ZoneAsia-Pk

Pakistan’s on-going war against terrorism – the final push – has so far claimed more than 910 militants in North Waziristan and decimated hundreds of militant camps. When Operation Zarb-e-Azb was launched, defence analysts from across the board exhorted the government to take a hands-on approach and work with the Army to develop a multi-pronged strategy to defeat extremism, separate from terrorism, but as big a threat as the latter.

Yet the government initially appeared not only reluctant to endorse a boots-on-the-ground approach but also quickly became sucked into a political imbroglio that shifted the entire country’s attention away from North Waziristan and the internally displaced persons in Bannu, to the Capital. Efforts to engage all state institutions in a political drama only served to exacerbate the government’s own position and paved the path for deep-state to raise eyebrows over the government’s legitimacy.

In the backdrop of the on-going military operation, a national political crisis, regional politics immersed in Machiavellian histrionics and the international security situation held hostage by the Islamic State, a breakaway faction of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan announced itself as the true vanguard that would bring Shariah to Pakistan.

Many quarters have felt that the formation of Jamatul Ahrar signifies a victory of sorts – Pakistan’s largest militant threat developing defections from within shows weakness and a dissonance that can allow the Army and government to end the TTP question once and for all. Fragmentation can only mean smaller weaker targets, easy to take out. The first sign of defeat for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was when it broke into factions, maybe the stratagems that ended Sri Lanka’s 30-year-old war could also put an end to militancy in Pakistan.

However, this needs to be examined in a larger context and it might just be too soon to bring out the champagne.

The TTP claims a certain a ideology. Their’s is a war to reassert orthodox Islamic values in their own vein of interpretation. The seed of war here stems not from social injustice, a sense of deprivation or against foreign occupation – the seed is an idea. When the government decided to hold talks with the TTP, there was an outcry from within TTP structures that believed that there could no compromise on ideas – that would be compromising divine mandate.

It was in the midst of these talks that dissenting groups from within the TTP held attacks under the banner of Ahrarul Hind to jeapordise negotiations. The bombing of a district sessions court in Islamabad and the decapitation of Pakistan Army soldiers was their handiwork. Brutal at best, one could compare their line of ideology and strategy with the IS. The only difference was that all factions claimed allegiance to Mullah Omar, head of the Afghan Taliban under the Al-Qaeda umbrella.

The Jamat, with all the media-savyness of former TTP spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan, claims the support of 70 to 80 TTP commanders. In an hour and a half long video, Maulana Qasim Khorasani (former TTP commander of Mohmand Agency chapter and inline to succeed Hekimullah Mehsud) announces that the TTP has fallen prey to self-seeking individuals (cue Mullah Fazalullah and all the commanders who pushed for talks). Their war is to build a global Caliphate and they will start from Pakistan. The group demonstrates no qualms about violence, they justify it through religion.

Ehsan, in a statement released last week, mentioned that while they were allied with the Afghan Taliban, the IS provided a good example as to how they planned to operate.

This should not serve to alleviate fears regarding militancy in Pakistan, this should serve to alarm. The group is headed by emir Maulana Qasim Khorasani, and Ihsan is its spokesman. Jamaat-ul-Ahrar’s shura, or executive council, includes: Omar Khalid al Khorasani, the powerful commander from Mohmand; Mansoor Nazim Shura and Maulana Haidar from Arakzai; Maulana Adbullah from Bajaur; Qari Ismail from Khyber; Qari Shakil Haqqani from Charsadda; Mufti Misbah from Peshawar; and Maulana Yasin from Swat. The Jamat includes Taliban factions from the tribal agencies of Mohmand, Bajaur, Khyber, and Arakzai, and the districts of Charsadda, Peshawar, and Swat.

By providing these groups an alternative to peace talks, we see the emergence of a new umbrella organisation, seemingly as big as the TTP if not bigger (if Ehsan is to be believed). The group claims that it will stop at nothing to achieve it’s goal of Islamic dominance in the world and they were willing to sacrifice for it.

This leaves the government with no excuse. The Pakistan National Security Council needs to come into action and develop a strategy to deal with new emerging threats. What with the announcement of an Al-Qaeda wing in India, these threats cannot be taken lightly. In a region where physical borders are more than just porous, collective action by the governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India is the need of the hour. There is no question of complacency here.

Beyond the ‘Revolution’

Tacstrat Analysis

From recounting in four constituencies to an overhaul of the whole system beginning with the resignation of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, our ‘revolutionaries’ seem to have come full circle to 2008. After the recent disclosure by a government official about the recent offer by the military to help the government out of the political mess in Islamabad in return for it not encroaching on the state’s foreign and security policy, one theory out there is that the backers of the ‘independence’ and ‘revolution’ marches could indeed be the security managers of the country, i.e., the military and the intelligence agencies.

It is no secret that the Pakistan Army and its intelligence agencies, by and large, have a hold over the country’s security and foreign policy. The Nawaz Sharif government’s attempt at trying to undo that arrangement, even if it came in the form of a draft of a tentative National Security Policy 2014-2018 in the parliament, might have unnerved the military.

The major point of contention in the draft is the emphasis the government has or had given to reconciliation or dialogue with the militants as opposed to the military’s desire to launch an operation against anti-state militants, in response to the burgeoning amount of terrorist attacks in the country. This was indeed seen with the continuous efforts at talks, by the government and the opposition, particularly, the PTI and the religious parties. Eventually, however, amidst failed talks, that were deemed pointless in some quarters; Operation Zarb-e-Azb was launched in July.

Another conjecture, appears to be the military’s strenuous relationship with the PMLN government, might entail a trust deficit particularly with regards to managing the state in the aftermath of Zarb e Azb. After all, why put so much effort in cleansing a whole region of enemy combatants and partially risk future strategic partnerships with those who have been doing the state’s bidding in the past, when, according to you, those running the show at home seem to be fully capable of messing everything at home and undoing the effort.

Talking about strategic partnerships, Afghanistan may answer part of the puzzle on the foreign policy front. With the drawdown in December this year, Nawaz Sharif’s ouster in Islamabad would mean setting back the diplomatic overtures made to Afghanistan on counter-terrorism collaboration, not that anything was achieved in the recent counter-terrorism talks between the intelligence officials on both sides. From the never-ending Afghan accusations at Pakistan to ongoing attacks being allegedly launched from both sides of the border against each other. It could be that the ruling party could not have been trusted at leveraging a ‘Pro-Pakistan’ post-2014 dispensation in Afghanistan.

Then, there’s India, the cancelling of the talks between the two foreign secretaries and the ongoing cross-border shelling and alleged ceasefire ‘violations’. Back-door channeling, promised by the PM’s of both the countries is gradually taking a back seat, with the present stalemate likely to be the least bad outcome for the medium-term. Lack of progress with New Delhi raises fear for Pakistan’s security apparatus with regards to the former’s future role in Afghanistan, something that is seen as inimical to Pakistan’s internal and external security interests. The ruling government, with its peace efforts, could have been seen as being dismissive of Pakistan’s security challenges in this regard.

It would be too premature to conclude the above conjecture as definite, for now. However, what seems clear is that the military as a whole is apprehensive of the government trying it to rein it in and would do everything it can to retain control over Pakistan’s foreign and security policy, something that it deems essential for the very survival of the state. The ruling government, on its own, is being called out as partially responsible for its own weakened state. One only needs to count all of those with the surname ‘Butt’ who have gained fame in the recent weeks to prove this notion right. Any foreseeable agreement between the government and the ‘revolutionaries’ has to be seen in the broader context of the institutional power politics that could be playing out. At the end of it all, it will be the change or lack of in the share of power between the different institutions that could really tell us about what this ‘revolution’ was in essence.

Pakistan’s IDP Crisis

By ZoneAsia-Pk

Residents of North Waziristan were made to leave their lives behind as they fled from aircrafts bombing their hometown. Almost half a million locals look forward to makeshift arrangements and little more than the infamous web of false promises that the government often lays out to camouflage its incompetency and mismanagement.

It comes as no surprise that the government has as yet failed to accommodate and provide for a majority of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). There is a clear shortage of food and water. Aid distribution centers are overcrowded. Many of the IDPs currently reside in nearly torn down schools and damaged buildings if they’re lucky, otherwise, there is little choice but to occupy charpoys out in the open at a time when temperatures are exceeding 40 degrees C.

Extremist and religious organizations, however, are cashing in on the government’s vulnerabilities; they have been given a chance to brainwash the IDP population and consequently incorporate fresh recruits.

Extremist religious organizations like the Jamaatud Dawa (JuD) are operating freely. The JuD alone has over 200 volunteers across Banu working to aid the IDPs. They have distributed more than 112,000 food packets and provided medical help for over 10,000 patients. This is certainly a golden opportunity to sway opinion in their favor and extremist organizations are not holding back. The Jamaatud Dawa is notorious as the front face of the world’s largest and most powerful terrorist groups.  However, the government seems to have taken little notice of this issue. While it’s busy wiping out certain terrorists it is also allowing for more to grow. This might be due to a failure on the government’s part to recognize this issue as a growing threat or it could be sheer carelessness. If eliminating terrorism is number one on the government’s agenda and the sole purpose of conducting Zarb-e-Azb then the government should be taking action against it on all fronts. Abandoning the IDPs and letting them get influenced by terrorist ideals now is perhaps even worse than letting them be in North Waziristan surrounded by the same ideals.

The minority Christians and Hindus IDPs perhaps have it even worse. About 500 individuals among this minority claim that they were living quite peacefully in North Waziristan alongside the Taliban and never felt any more threatened by the Taliban than by their Muslim neighbors. However, as IDPs they feel victim to a strong and obvious prejudice. There is a lack of available government aid for such minority communities with reports of facing trouble in even accessing the available food aid. While aid distribution camps are available minority communities complain of being outnumbered.

As IDPs struggle to get access to the basic necessities of life, the Punjab government is caught up in plans of its own. It comes as a severe shock that given the current situation, the federal government has recently announced that it will provide laptops to these IDPs. An astonishing number of 10,000 laptops will be provided to talented students and an additional 25,000 to deserving ones as per the Prime Minister’s Youth Program. Certainly, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf’s Central Information Secretary, Shireen Mazari spoke for the majority when she called this idea “ridiculous”. Even if we disregard the most basic objection regarding the impact of this misallocation of already limited resources on the government’s budget and the IDPs’s unmet ‘needs’,  how the Punjab government expects these laptops to function without electricity is worth considering. The majority of  IDPs do not have access to electricity. For the minority IDPs that have access to electricity provision is limited to only certain hours of the day. Nonetheless, what the current events demand is not a focus on the ‘wants’ of the IDPs but the ‘needs’. Unless these laptops are made to quench the thirst or satisfy the hunger of the starving IDPs the urgency with which such an initiative is being looked into by the government right now is almost incomprehensible.

These IDPs comprise the most vulnerable section of our population. They have left the comfort of their homes in the hope of a better future. It is the government’s duty to offer sanctuary to them and provide for their ‘needs’ indiscriminately. Allowing them to fall prey to the agenda of the Taliban is not something that the country can afford.

In a State of War

By FOR PAKISTAN

Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan is the kinetic portion of a counter-terrorism operation being carried out by the security forces in all parts of the country – while the nation rushes to help hundreds of thousands of tribesmen displaced by the newest phase of this almost-decade-long conflict, the Pakistani public needs to be fully aware of their responsibilities to the IDPs as well as their duty to the nation and the state by becoming intelligent and aware human beings who can identify the despicable enemy within…

Pakistan is in a state of war. Make no mistake about it. Terrorist attacks that occurred on an almost-daily basis (sometimes multiple times at multiple locations in a single day) which have significantly abated, and military operations on a limited scale in areas under the control of – or vulnerable to – militancy and terror groups are not random events that cannot be tied together with a single string of ideas: and yes, this string does not need to have a basis in the logic that “this is not our war; it was forced on us because of American intervention in Afghanistan; we should have maintained a policy of non-interference; we turned our back on our Muslim brothers” and so on. Pakistan is in a state of war: and it has been in a state of war since 2004. Though undeclared and unannounced, the tit-for-tat between militants and the military can only be accurately understood and correctly interpreted – by experts as well as by the general public – if we accept and acknowledge that we have been at war with a dastardly and despicable enemy for almost a decade now.

Though Pakistan has been fighting an undeclared – since until some months ago, un-owned – war since 2004, when terror attacks first started occurring in Pakistan in the form of bomb blasts, this war came to our doorstep in full force during 2007: the events and the aftermath of the Lal Masjid siege laid the groundwork for taking the (militants’) war against Pakistan (and the military’s war for Pakistan) to the next level. Between 2007 and 2013, the war cost Pakistan more than any other country in the entire world when measured in terms of infrastructure damage and loss of life. Pakistan still mourns more than 50,000 dead citizens and law enforcement officials (including soldiers and policemen), and the damage to the national economy has been estimated at over US$ 100 billion.

Concentrated military operations took place in the tribal agencies at various points in time between 2007 and 2010, and then the most significant counter-terror operation took place in the South Waziristan tribal agency (2009) and in the settled area of Swat (twice in 2009 alone). Alongside these major operations that were led by the Pakistan Army, other operations by the military, paramilitary, and intelligence agencies – as well as routine operations by civilian law enforcement agencies and police forces – have continued to take place over time: one may imagine that they have only increased and, with the promulgation of the Protection of Pakistan Bill, will have a significant impact in terms of actually bringing terrorists, criminals and anti-state elements to justice.

OPERATION ZARB-E-AZB: TAKING THE FIGHT TO THE TTP

Since mid-June, a full-fledged kinetic operation has been launched by the Army and Air Force in the tribal agency that was considered to be the “hub” or “command center” of the TTP terrorist organization, where it had taken control of many areas and established bases, weapons depots, training centers, and “troop concentration” areas where many foreign militants were also hiding. The operation was launched after continued efforts by the incumbent government to reach a negotiated peace with the TTP failed – and continued to cost Pakistan heavily and dearly as the security forces maintained a ceasefire while TTP elements and cadres continued to attack state and society – and according to Pakistan’s own timetable: it is no secret that among America’s “do more” list for Pakistan, a military operation in North Waziristan (particularly against the “Haqqani network” that operates against U.S., NATO and Afghan forces with devastating impact) was on the top for many years.

THE WAR ALL OVER PAKISTAN: THE CRITICAL STATUS OF KARACHI

Before the kinetic military operation was launched in North Waziristan, a quasi-military (police action led by the paramilitary Rangers force) had been launched in Karachi – and in other parts of Sindh – since late 2013 to combat increased terrorist and criminal activities in Karachi which had continued to rise since 2009-10; multiple attacks and criminal/terror activities were reported in the city on a daily basis for the past few years, resulting in elevated security levels that have been maintained since then (and only enhanced by the incumbent government after it came into power in May 2013). Though covert and strictly secretive in nature, a full-fledged operation against terrorism, militancy, extortion, and serious criminal activities is taking place in Karachi since the new PML-N government took office in 2013: ostensibly, this operation has the support of the PPP – which was in the federal government until 2013, but continues to govern the Sindh province, while the MQM (the PPP’s sometimes-ally-sometimes-adversary) alleges that the operation is designed to target MQM workers and party cadres. Despite a serious attempt – or increased seriousness in the attempt – to secure Karachi and stabilize the economic hub and financial capital of Pakistan, serious loopholes in the security apparatus of the city (particularly the civilian security institutions) continue to raise eyebrows. Senior police positions at the Additional Inspector General (AIG) and Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) still remain vacant in Karachi, though thankfully, the position of Inspector General (IG) of Sindh Police has recently been filled on a full-time basis. Many continue to ask: who is responsible for the continued uncertainty – and resultant instability – of these senior police positions remaining vacant in the interim period? Is the Government of Sindh or the Interior Ministry in Islamabad to blame? To be more precise: is the trust deficit between the PPP and the PML-N (or fears of the military) to blame? Did the previous government not launch an operation of this scale and magnitude in Karachi due to political expediency, since its major political power base in is Sindh if not Karachi? Did it not want to ruffle the feathers of its then-political ally, the MQM, which “controls” the political outcomes in Karachi, whether it is an electoral exercise or a political activity? These questions still require definite and cogent answers, even as the Supreme Court continues its hearing on a suo moto case regarding Karachi’s security: a case whose previous judgments declared that political parties maintain militant wings in the city, and a case whose hearings still continue despite two Chief Justices (by cause of superannuation) having retired since the case started.

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES: NO DEARTH OF HEROES

A trend of terror attacks in Karachi that has picked up pace and has become more frequent is one where security forces’ officials – particularly those of the police – are being targeted in Karachi. To those who have been studying the case of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Pakistan, similarities can definitely be drawn with terrorist operations in Peshawar in yesteryears, when at least two senior and extremely important security officials – Peshawar’s Capital City Police Officer (CCPO), Malik Saad, and Inspector General of the Frontier Corps (IGFC) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Safwat Ghayur – were assassinated by militants after being continually targeted in various attempts. These are but two among many brave and valiant security officials to whom the people of Peshawar and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in particular – and the people of Pakistan as a whole – will always remain indebted, since they were the first and last line of defence between the TTP and its terrorist affiliates taking over a major urban city in the KP province adjoining the FATA tribal agencies. Karachi’s CID chief, Chaudhry Aslam, was targeted multiple times, and was eventually martyred by a bomb attack on January 09, 2014: again, he is one of many security officials serving in Sindh who laid down their lives in the fight against terrorism and terrorists. The Pakistani nation continues to be indebted to these heroes, and knows that the nation’s security forces have such shining examples which will continue to serve as beacons of excellence and models of what a protector of the nation and the people is like. Though Pakistan has lost these brave men to the dastardly attacks of terrorists and to the immortal embrace of martyrdom, there are still many more experienced, capable, competent and valiant professionals who continue to serve in the civilian security forces, the paramilitary and the military: it is because of them that Pakistan continues to exist as a viable nation-state whose existence can be sustained and will be perpetuated for the years to come.

NATIONWIDE SECURITY ALERT: TWO PERSPECTIVES

Since the start of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, a nationwide security alert is in place. The operation’s casus belli (reason for initiation) is considered to be the attack on the Karachi airport, which was an assault conducted by Uzbek militants who were sheltered and trained by the TTP. Security of all airports throughout the country has been strengthened, with multiple layers and rings of protection established around airport perimeters. Nevertheless, Karachi continues to be a volatile security flashpoint: even as late as July 2013, police officials and Rangers paramilitary forces were targeted by gunmen as well as shot at when they conducted search operations in volatile areas of Karachi, like Lyari, Sohrab Goth, and Katti Pahari, among others. And the above-stated trend also continues: CCTV footage released recently showed that terrorists on a motorbike deliberately targeted a police official in uniform as he was riding his own motorbike in front of them (and unaware that terrorists were behind him and about to shoot him): the first few shots resulted in the police official’s motorbike going out of control, skidding, and coming to a halt near the curb of the street. The terrorists on the motorbike followed suit: they rode up to the policeman in distress, and the terrorist with the gun got off to shoot the policeman at point-blank range in execution style. The CCTV footage ends by showing that the terrorists took the policeman’s sidearm weapon (and/or some other article) from his dead or dying body, and then making their escape on the motorbike. There are two ways of interpreting this: terrorists have now increased their targeting of security forces personnel – especially when the latter are least expecting it – in order to lower the morale of the public (who cannot expect to be safe if their guardians, the police and law enforcement officers, are so vulnerable to terrorists) as well as law enforcement agencies (who would have to take added measures to protect themselves from terrorists, and would thus deviate from their original responsibility of protecting the people, and by doing so, would create additional hindrances in effective and timely communication between the citizenry and law enforcement agencies). The other way of interpreting this is that because of the ongoing security operation in Karachi, which has many dimensions (counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, counter-intelligence, crime reduction, restoration of law and order), the terrorists are losing their ground in the city: their cadres and cells, their support from political parties and external intelligence agencies, and most importantly, their sources of weapons and financing (such as theft, robbery, gun-running, narcotics peddling, and recently extortion, which has become a cancer for the city and a bane for its financial elite) are becoming scarce, so they are making last-ditch efforts to revive their strength and importance in the city by targeting those forcing which have systematically eroded these capabilities of all anti-state and anti-social elements (from petty criminals, to miscreants and criminal gangs, to terrorists and terrorist financiers who are linked with organizations like the TTP and therefore are part of national as well as trans-national criminal/terrorist networks).

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN POLITICAL SUPPORT AND PUBLIC SUPPORT

Despite its allegations that the ongoing (kinetic but low-intensity) operation in Karachi is designed to target and eliminate its workers – and its “electoral strength” in the city – the MQM held a rally in favour of the Pakistan Army and to express its solidarity with the ongoing military operation in North Waziristan on July 06, 2014: the event brought together political parties like the PML-N and the APML (led by incumbent Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and his arch nemesis of late, former President Pervez Musharraf, respectively). Though all parties were ostensibly invited to the event so that they may, in unison and with unanimity, express solidarity with the Armed Forces, the PTI did not attend and did not send any of its members or a delegation to this political show of support for the ongoing military operation. In a scenario where almost all political parties shed their acrimony towards one another and came together for a national cause (for the sake of appearances if nothing else), the PTI still found an excuse to not partake in the rally – not that its support for the military, or Operation Zarb-e-Azb, or its efforts to shelter the IDPs are to be measured by the number of party members that it would have sent. In a national talk show, a PTI legislator said that the party was not “properly invited” to the rally – one wonders why (and how) all other national and provincial parties made it to the widely publicized event through “improper invitations” from the MQM.

In order to truly exhibit political maturity and express solidarity with a national cause and an intensive effort to consolidate national interest, the representatives of the people need to rise up and get out of their shell(s) of insecurity and self-interest that binds them to the basics of political survival: if these characteristics cannot be displayed by parties that operate and get elected at a national level, then any military operation in a specific area will not be successful because in its aftermath, the country’s civilian leadership will be ill-equipped (and frankly, not concerned) with winning the hearts and minds of Pakistan’s tribal citizens who have long been neglected and deprived, and who have been suffering for decades so that their fellow citizens in other cities and provinces can enjoy relative security and the benefits of economic development (no matter how miniscule they are). And – this goes without saying – regardless of whom one voted for, and regardless of whether a political party joins a rally in support and solidarity of the Armed Forces or not, the entire nation is grateful of the services and sacrifices rendered by the brave men and women who wear the uniform of the Pakistani security forces: the people of Pakistan do not need to attend a rally or shout slogans to show the Pakistan Army (or anyone else, for that matter) that their soldiers are our heroes; that the people are cognizant of the fact that the Army has been holding the nation together and keeping the state intact by denying terrorists the space and capability to turn Pakistan into a failed state; that our brave and valiant soldiers are not only loved and cherished, but also immortal in the ultimate sacrifice that they present in the service of the nation and for the protection of the people. Without a shadow of a doubt, they acquire the exalted status of immortal martyrs by giving their lives for the people of Pakistan: and the people of Pakistan are least ungrateful of such an enormous sacrifice, for the martyrs of Pakistan live on forever in the hearts of the people. Such is the power of public support (and its eminence over political support) and such is the bond that the people of Pakistan – especially true patriots – have with the brave men and women, soldiers and officers of the Armed Forces and all of Pakistan’s security forces: the fearless defenders of the motherland, whose doctrine is that “it is better to live for something than to die for nothing”.

THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT’S CAPACITY AND THE NATION’S CAPABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

The Pakistan Army has carried out offensive operations in limited areas within the country’s territorial confines to clear specific areas and eliminate militants and terrorist strongholds from those areas: if the nation-wide structure and apparatus of terrorism is to be eliminated from its roots, then a nation-wide military operation is required. This is why Pakistan has been in a state of war for almost a decade now – a low-intensity conflict gathering momentum and transforming into medium-intensity intensity warfare in the settled urban areas where highly protected sensitive installations of the government and military are attacked by militants. But the nation-wide war has not been launched by the military precisely because of the dearth of effective, capable and altruistic civilian leadership at the helm of government: the military can only “clear” and “hold” vulnerable areas, while the civilian government (and the public) has to take over governance of the area and manage the “build” as well as “transfer” phases of a counter-insurgency operation. Redevelopment of a warzone should be the primary priority once the military objectives are achieved so that displaced residents can be resettled and basic infrastructure restored (and improved) to serve their needs. Complete transfer of authority – particularly the policing of the area with improved protocols and heightened alert levels – can only take place if state institutions (and officials of the state and government) are capable enough to exercise and perpetuate the writ of the state that is re-established in the area(s) successfully cleared by the military.

If the incapacity of elected civilian governments at the federal and provincial levels is a sad reality in Pakistan, it must not be allowed to dampen the spirit of the Pakistani people, who can rebuild what is destroyed through sheer will and determination: after countless natural calamities and man-made disasters that Pakistan has suffered, it is the indomitable will of the people that prevails and perseveres, and it is the rock-solid foundation of the country’s existence. Anything built on top of it can be rebuilt if destroyed, and it can be improved if it is not effective. The people of Pakistan must not only support the military by chanting slogans and holding rallies: the citizenry must undertake their civic responsibilities – enormous as they are – towards the nation and towards their fellow countrymen by rebuilding what is lost or destroyed, and by undertaking a soul-searching, introspective national discourse on whether radicalism, fundamentalism and militancy in the name of religious purification should be allowed in Pakistan, or whether it should be holistically eliminated and surgically eradicated from every nook and corner of the vast homeland of Punjabis, Sindhis, Baluch, Pashtuns, Hazara, Gilgitis, Kashmiris, Seraiki, and so many other ethnicities and linguistic groupings who profess to be Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, Parsis, and various other creeds and denominations. Celebrating unity in Pakistan’s rich diversity will not only serve to include the long-neglected tribal brethren into the national mainstream, but will also help in the idea of Pakistan – and the reality of Pakistan – winning the hearts and minds of disenchanted Muslims as well as radicalized Islamists, who would be incentivized to shun their regressive beliefs and actions in favour of a modern, progressive, inclusive and development-oriented approach that will take Pakistan and all Pakistanis to the heights of greatness, prominence and eminence among the comity of nations. Without a doubt, that is Pakistan’s destiny, and any diversion from the path of this goal is a short-lived hindrance, not an “existential threat” as many would believe. This nation, founded by the ideals of a philosopher poet and the efforts of a renowned, respected and acclaimed lawyer, has yet to realize its true potential: once the people of Pakistan unite in service of a common cause, there is nothing that can hold them back. History has proved this again and again, from the birth of Pakistan till today, and if the citizens of Pakistan realize their common national purpose and their civic duty to the nation-state, the future holds infinite opportunities and boundless hope for progress and improvement so that one day, Pakistanis will hold their heads high among other nationalities and proudly say, “I am Pakistani”.

DEFEATING THE TERRORISTS: THE ROLE OF PAKISTANI CITIZENS IN OPERATION ZARB-E-AZB

Today, the general public is the most important source of intelligence and counter-terrorism information since they have the potential of becoming the eyes and ears of security forces – particularly in the urban environment, where terrorists can easily gel into the crowd, form sleeper cells, obtain refuge, and even undertake criminal activities to sustain the cell or evolve into a larger anti-state organization. Since the public forms the core component of the community, they are able to notice changes and anomalies within their home environment and local community more easily than security forces are able to. It is, therefore, the responsibility of the people of Pakistan to play their role in securing their communities and cities: by no means does this include taking the law into one’s own hands. Citizens must become more aware and more cognizant of their surroundings; they must maintain regular contact and communication with other members of their community and society, as well as with those officials of law enforcing agencies who are deputed to protect and secure them and the areas in which they live. Any anomaly or perceived changes must be studied closely and carefully; while there could be cases of false alarms, time and again it has been proven – also in Pakistan – that timely information from responsible citizens and effective policing efforts by local law enforcement (without giving suspected terrorists and miscreants time to adapt, retreat, or respond/retaliate) have resulted in successful prevention of acts of terror that – if they were to take place – would have resulted in the deaths of many Pakistanis, and injuries (sometimes fatal, other times life-changing) to many others. To do this, the people of Pakistan must overcome the perpetual trust deficit that exists between the public and the police: recognizing this deficit, security forces – particularly the Army – has set up special counter-terror information hotlines in major cities, so that information from citizens in the community may be passed directly to the relevant intelligence agency, and so that the police responds in an effective and supportive fashion rather than relegating actionable intelligence items and/or critical threats to a lower level of importance: to the detriment of not only the general public that bears the brunt of terror attacks, but also that of the integrity and operational effectiveness of the police force.

State and society must work together to eliminate criminals, terrorists and anti-state elements who pose a clear and dangerous threat to peace, public security, the lives and properties of Pakistani citizens, and to the state of Pakistan and its writ over the country’s territory. Society needs to overcome the psychological obstacles which prevent them from being an active part of public policing – an activity where the community helps local police and law enforcement maintain a vigilant eye on the neighbourhood and act preemptively to apprehend suspects and prevent them from disguising themselves as members of the community (before they plan and undertake their planned terrorist activities). In case the threat is of a continuing nature, such as criminal elements threatening the public through threats, display of weaponry, extortion demands, etc. then police and law enforcement agencies must be involved at the very first instance, so that these elements can be completely rooted out. The same goes for drug dealers and narcotics peddlers, since they form an integral part of a supply chain that yields financial benefits for terrorist insurgents (leaders as well as sleeper cells organized in various urban centers and settled areas): sometimes, terrorists themselves sell narcotics in order to acquire funds for implementing their plans and strategies designed to disturb public peace and wreak havoc and mayhem on society as well as the state.

Only by joining hands and consolidating forces can this ignominious threat be overcome: otherwise the ongoing operation and related counter-terrorism activities – including the promulgation of the Protection of Pakistan Bill – will be useless. The people of Pakistan must truly and wholeheartedly be “on board” with the state and security forces, and fight the menace of terrorism, extremism, intolerance, militancy and fundamentalism with the founding pillars of this great country: unity, faith, and discipline.

Help the Government of Pakistan and the Armed Forces: call 1135 to report any suspicious activity

Operation Zarb-e-Azb: The Battle for Pakistan

At long last, the powerful Sword of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) is slashing through the strongholds of the (munifiqeen) in the tribal areas of the country: Operation Zarb-e-Azb has entered the second phase in North Waziristan, and ground forces have launched a kinetic counter-terrorism operation to surgically root out terrorists from this alleged “safe haven” which served as a launching pad for terrorists and extremists to conduct attacks in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan – but what are the priorities of the government and of the state? Are the people of Pakistan ready to become the active, conscientious citizenry that their country requires them to be; or will political instability continue to chip away at the foundations of Pakistan’s stability and national security?

Pakistan has been at war since 2004 – though the nation didn’t realize it then, because the “trickle down” effect of economic development was actually reaching the common man, and because terrorists were only targeting the country’s then-president, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Musharraf. It was only in 2007 when the country realized the daunting challenge that it was facing: terrorists and Islamic radicals had taken over a seminary in the federal capital of Islamabad, and had become a law unto themselves. A military operation was launched to secure the seminary (an abode for imparting Islamic studies, which had been taken over by terrorists in the pursuit of what they deemed was a “higher, purer purpose”) and while the militants were dislodged from this “base of operations” a few blocks away from the corridors of power, far away in the tribal areas, Al-Qaeda inspired militant groups coalesced to form the Pakistani Taliban, and vowed to take revenge from the Pakistani state and the military for what they deemed was an unforgivable act of sacrilege. As Islamic militants capitalized on the aftermath of the Lal Masjid siege and continuity of the country’s unstable political environment to the maximum extent possible, a bloody insurgency was launched by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – the Pakistani version of the Taliban who would overthrow the state in favour of sharia law and a decadent, ineffective and uniquely despicable form of government, as the Afghan Taliban did in 1994 – that has, till date, cost the lives of more than 50,000 Pakistanis, including over 10,000 security forces personnel (military, paramilitary, police, intelligence operatives, and others), and has exacted a toll of more than US$ 100 billion on the country’s economy in terms of destroyed infrastructure, capital flight because of those persons and families who wished to (and had the means to) escape the conflict and mayhem, and decreased investor and donor confidence in the country. The TTP declared the Federally Administered Tribal Areas to be under their control, with their leadership headquartered in North Waziristan, while they attempted to make inroads into the settled areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and to establish covert strongholds and deploy sleeper cells in the major cities of the country, such as Peshawar, Karachi, Lahore, and other smaller urban centers. At times, the TTP – their predecessor militias and their commanders, as well as their affiliates – entered into political agreements with the military or with the local tribal leadership to cease hostilities so that “peace” may return to conflict-ridden areas, so that Muslims would not be forced to kill their Muslim brothers, and most importantly, so that the Pakistani Taliban are an equivalent guarantor of this “peace” as much as the state or the military is.

The necessity of recognizing the TTP as a potent military force was not a willing choice – and the time gained during cessation of hostilities was not wasted by the Pakistani military at the very least: as the TTP broke the terms of their own ceasefire and blamed the state and military for it, all this time the Pakistan Army was transforming itself into one of the most powerful counter-insurgency forces in the world. Time and again, with or without a ceasefire agreement, whenever the TTP launched a massive terror offensive or attempted to gain control of an area, the Pakistan Army was called in – as Prime Minister Gilani stated when the military operation to retake the Swat valley was launched – to “restore the sanctity of our pure nation-state, uphold national integrity and pride, eliminate militants and militancy (from the concerned area) completely, and ensure the security and wellbeing of the people of Pakistan”. Military operations were launched in Bajaur, Mohmand, Kurram, Orakzai, Buner, Lower Dir, Shangla, the city of Swat in Malakand district, and even in South Waziristan. All these military operations successfully achieved their tactical objectives, but the strategic objective of eliminating terrorism from Pakistan was still not realized: partly because of civilian incapacity (both in the government side and from the civil society and general public), partly because the military had specific and particular goals (and did not want to infringe upon the domain of the civilian government, rightfully so or otherwise), and partly because the root causes of terrorism – extremism, intolerance, and rampant religious fundamentalism – were still not identified and no mechanism was created to deal with these problems that continue to pervade various dimensions of Pakistani society and way of life.

Until 2013, the activities of the Pakistan military were concentrated in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (through the paramilitary Frontier Corps, which has now become one of the best and most battle-hardened COIN forces in the region if not the world): after the PML-N government came into power, a low-intensity counter-terrorism operation was launched in Karachi with the paramilitary Rangers in the lead, and with the help of intelligence and counter-intelligence activities, to dislodge militant elements, sleeper cells and terrorist financiers from the metropolis and to restore peace, tranquility, security, and law and order in the country’s economic capital. This operation has come a long way, and with the increased strength of the Sindh police and other civilian law enforcement units (through training and active deployment in one of the most dangerous cities in the world) who are responsible for the security of Karachi in particular and the Sindh province as a whole, it is currently in its fourth or fifth stage as intelligence agencies have taken the lead in identifying and targeting anti-state elements in the city and coordinating efforts with law enforcement agencies to proactively prevent these miscreants from wreaking havoc and creating disorder in the financial hub of Pakistan. The exact nature, operational intensity, deployment of forces, methodology of threat assessment, mechanism for coordinating actionable intelligence, and response protocols for preventing (and responding to) acts of terror have not been fully revealed to the public – as the case should be, since announcing these specifics would be akin to giving the terrorists a “head start” and putting them two steps ahead of the law enforcement agencies, for the mere sake of “provision of information” by the “free media”. To reveal these sensitive state secrets that are of a contemporary nature and hold immense operational significance would not only be a crime, but it would be an unforgivable act of irresponsibility if it is done (and has been done) for the sake of ratings by news media outlets and TV channels. The TTP never announced which particular area it would bomb at which particular time using which particular method: but Pakistan’s news channels continuously made the grave mistake of announcing security operations days if not hours in advance, giving militants and anti-state forces a chance to retreat or initiate countermeasures.

Thankfully, the government and state – and especially the military – has learned fully from these antics of the country’s newborn electronic media (which is free but reckless and irresponsible), and as the PML-N government vowed to negotiate a peace settlement with the TTP since late 2013, the Pakistan military carefully fine-tuned and adopted its “talk-fight” approach and prepared itself for every eventuality: including that of the talks failing, which was bound to happen if recent history provides any measure of what a treaty or agreement means to the militants. The negotiations process started slowly and through intermediaries: very successfully, the media’s full attention – if not that of the entire nation – was directed onto the talks between the TTP’s and govermments’ negotiators committees. Despite the death of TTP leader Hakeemullah Mehsud in a drone attack in early November 2013, the talks process continued even though TTP commanders vowed to exact vengeance for “every drop of Hakeemullah’s blood that had been spilt”. An IED exploded in a rented van which was preparing to transport paramilitary FC personnel to Miram Shah base in North Waziristan: what was a routine operation soon became the center of attention and the focus of the nation’s (and the military’s) anger, because the state had been observing a ceasefire while the TTP continued to carry out attacks against military and civilian targets. Earlier, a senior Army commander, Major General Sanaullah Khan Niazi, was martyred along with an officer and soldier of the Pakistan Army while the talks process was ongoing: the nation and the military let the fire of rage burn inside them as they continued to support the civilian government’s attempt to “give peace a chance” by means of negotiation and dialogue.

The military had learned much more than the virtues of patience, the importance of unity as expressed through improved civil-military relations, and the effectiveness of counter-insurgency tactics and strategy in various terrains: the significant impact of air operations, and of using airborne weapons platforms to dominate the battlefield on the ground, was also operationalized and improved as 2014 began. For every action, there was an equal and opposite reaction: since the TTP was a loose grouping of militants and militant organizations who had coalesced under a common anti-state banner for their own personal benefit and operational consolidation, the leadership said it was in favour of peace talks as different subordinate “units” of the TTP (ostensibly against any form of negotiated peace) continued to attack Pakistan. For these dastardly actions, the Pakistan Army – through its Air Defence wing – and the Pakistan Air Force pounded terrorist hideouts and targeted its scattered leadership and cadres every time they attacked the citizens of Pakistan or the security forces. The military – and through the media, the general public – had also learned of the deepening of cracks and fissures within the TTP over the issue of negotiating with the Pakistani state (and more importantly, over the issue of leadership and devolution of command to regional commanders). Infighting had broken out among TTP cadres in South Waziristan, as the Khaled Mehsud (aka Khan Said Sajna) group battled the forces of Shehryar Mehsud. The former was slated to become TTP chief after the death of Hakimullah Mehsud in November 2013, but was passed over for the incapable and ineffective Mullah Fazlullah, while the latter had taken control of the meager forces which were loyal to Hakeemullah Mehsud (and therefore wished to fight against Pakistan and take revenge, rather than negotiate with it). Fazlullah tried to play his role as the TTP leader and end the infighting among his commanders, but ended up making a grave mistake which could not be undone. He announced that he had removed Sajna from his position of commander of TTP in South Waziristan, and appointed and interim leader for the time that the TTP “shura” would take to appoint a new leader for the tribal agency. By the end of May 2014, Sajna effectively broke off ties with the TTP, its head Mullah Fazlullah, and its leadership council or “shura”: he formed his own “TTP South Waziristan”, and took much of the Mehsud tribal militants (the core of the TTP’s fighting force in FATA) and the Punjabi Taliban (militants of banned outfits like LeJ, SSP, JeM, etc.). Sajna was also known to have much better ties with the Haqqani network and the Afghan Taliban than the TTP did – the latter professed fealty to Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar, while they barely followed any of his commands and edicts, and the Afghan Taliban as well as Mullah Omar neither acknowledged the TTP nor claimed to have any operational links or ties with the Pakistani Taliban. In one fell swoop, Khan Said Sajna destroyed the fledgling control of the TTP that Fazlullah was trying to consolidate ever since he was appointed as the central leader of the TTP: since Fazlullah belonged to Swat and not to the tribal areas, he was neither fully recognized nor welcome in the areas where the TTP actually had control on the ground, and the TTP leadership council (the “shura”) comprising of main TTP commanders was also unhappy with Fazlullah’s leadership style (they claimed that Fazlullah operated in a dictatorial fashion and issued decrees, rather than giving due importance to the “shura” and engaging in consultations over important issues before issuing or announcing the decision of the TTP leadership – as opposed to that of the TTP’s leader). It was exactly this manner of “commanding” the TTP whereby Fazlullah made the deadly mistake of removing Sajna first, and then asking the “shura” to validate his decision and appoint a new commander for South Waziristan afterwards – akin to killing his only cow and later remembering that he had run out of milk to spill and cry about.

The TTP infighting that started in South Waziristan spread to the forested Shawal valley of North Waziristan, and dozens of TTP cadres were being killed daily in these internecine gunfights and pitched battles. And as early as February/March 2014, elements of the Pakistan Army (including mountain warfare specialists, guerilla tacticians, SSG commandos, infantry personnel, and – as the success of the aerial offensive of Operation Zarb-e-Azb would show – members of the elite Pakistan Air Forces commandos, or SSG-A, who have expertise in laser targeting for guidance of precision munitions and are trained as ground combat controllers) were inserted into North Waziristan to conduct what the military calls “minor ops”. As part of its new war-fighting doctrine, the Pakistan Army trains its officers and soldiers to conduct “minor ops” alongside major operations and coordinated offensives – while the latter are carefully designed and calibrated at the Army-level, the Corps-level, the regiment-level and the battalion-level, “minor ops” can be carried out at the platoon-level or even at the unit-level. “Minor ops” are designed to attack the enemy from the rear, to carry out attrition warfare and to continually harass the enemy in order to lower their morale, keep them disoriented, and maintain an imbalance in the forward-operating forces of the enemy so that a major operation has greater chance of succeeding and meets little to no resistance from the battered and bruised opposition that it will meet at the enemy’s first line of defense. As far as the “minor ops” against the TTP and their allied militants in FATA go, such operations would include: short, swift, unexpected gun battles that would eliminate TTP leaders and their security details; creating confusion within TTP cadres and among TTP groups, and overall dissension in the ranks of the militant umbrella organization and their subordinate militias; exacerbating existing rifts between militant commanders and creating new sources of tension and acrimony whenever the chance presents itself; locating, identifying and “softening” the hardened targets, such as militant command centers and facilities, fortified and makeshift bunkers to repulse attacks from conventional military forces, and storage facilities for weapons stockpiling and manufacturing of bombs and IEDs, in advance of a military operation that would completely wipe out the TTP from their “command base”. As it happens, these elite units also performed two very important additional tasks in the months before the formal launch of Operation Zarb-e-Azb: they identified important targets for the military that needed to be destroyed and devised area-wise perimeters in a way that tribesmen and civilians would be able to peruse safe passage out of the warzone while the militants would be locked in a tight “noose” that would surround these important targets (those militants who tried to escape would be shot down by snipers, while those who wait for their ration stockpiles to run out would also be sitting ducks for PAF airstrikes, gunship helicopter attacks and artillery bombardment). The second important task was the coordination and guidance of precise munitions used by the Army and Air Force for bombing militant concentrations, important militant facilities, command centers and weapons depots used by militants, and other compounds used for housing foreign militants or for training suicide bombers: to guide the precision munitions of the two arms of the military, the crack units deployed in advance would not only have training, but would also have the equipment to guide bombs, missiles, gunship helicopters, and artillery to their precise targets – thus taking out the militants with full force, wrath and fury that the nation and the military had kept under control for months if not years, and avoiding any form of collateral damage in which tribesmen and their families would become victims of the bombing runs by the Army and Air Force.

On June 15, 2014, the ISPR announced that Operation Zarb-e-Azb had been launched to cleanse North Waziristan of TTP militants and foreigners whom the TTP had been training and sheltering. A few days earlier, in what is considered the casus belli for launching the operation, the Jinnah International Airport in Karachi was attacked by militants who intended to take control of the airport and create a hostage situation, in addition to disrupting regular flights and trying to expose the weaknesses of Pakistan’s security forces in defending critical infrastructure. As soon as the attack was launched, all elements of the security forces – including elite SSG commandos – were brought into the equation, and an operation to retake the airport and kill or capture the terrorists was initiated. The retaliatory operation ended successfully within a matter of hours: certain news media outlets claimed that the terrorists who attacked the airport were foreigners, and appeared to be Uzbeks. For a long time, the TTP has been harbouring foreign militants and has been providing them with safe haven, training, and has been coordinating with them operationally in different theaters of war and against different enemies: the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) are some of the main foreign militant groups that were allied with the TTP if not the Afghan Taliban, and the TTP routinely deployed cadres of these militant groups to launch attacks in Pakistan.

The attack on the Karachi airport forced the military to put its foot down: despite what many believe are cozy civil-military relations in Pakistan, where the civilian government and the military leadership are “on the same page” (whereas, in a potent democracy, the civilian leadership commands the military and has the final say in authorizing or forbidding any kind of military action), this time it was the ISPR – as opposed to the President of Pakistan, who is Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, or the Prime Minister, the powerful chief executive who issued the orders for the operation in Swat when Yousaf Raza Gilani held the office – which announced that a military operation in North Waziristan is being (read: has been) launched, and the operation has been codenamed “Zarb-e-Azb”, which means a sharp slash of Al-Azb, the sword that the Holy Prophet (PBUH) used in his battles against the infidels. Whether the military shot first and the civilian government asked questions later, or not, is an issue for the historians to decide: but the announcement of the launch of operation(s) in North Waziristan was a welcome initiative in many aspects. For years, the U.S. had been calling for a military operation in the volatile tribal agency that had become the hub of militant activities (and since the TTP controlled most parts of it, it allowed the Afghan Taliban and the dreaded Haqqani network a stepping stone on the Afghan border to launch attacks against NATO forces and Afghan troops deep within Afghanistan – a deadly reversal of the “strategic depth” phenomenon which favoured militant groups at the expense of the Afghan and Pakistani states). An operation in North Waziristan was on the top of the American “do more” list, in terms of things that Pakistan needed to do in order to eliminate terrorism and militancy (and perhaps extremism too) from the region – according to the U.S. perspective. Interestingly, a senior U.S. diplomat visited Pakistan in mid-May and asked the country to launch an operation in North Waziristan before the second “run-off” phase of the Afghan presidential election, and reports about the request vary: some say the diplomat asked for the operation to be finished successfully before the Afghans go to the poll for the second time. The run-off election between contestants Abdullah Abdullah – the frontrunner who lost and blamed his defeat on poll-rigging – and Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai – the underdog who received double the amount of votes that he did in the first phase, thereby getting six percent more than the required 50% to be elected Afghan president – took place on June 14: the ISPR announced the launch of the operation the next day. The operation’s codename also makes important references to sacred religious articles, thereby appealing to the beliefs and base instincts (if not reason and rationale) of conservative Muslims in Pakistan: that the TTP are the infidels and (munafiqeen) who cannot be trusted, who have broken their pledges and commitments, and who cannot be negotiated with, while the soldiers and officers of the Pakistan Armed Forces are the true “mujahideen” who have launched a decisive “jihad” against these anti-state elements who had been killing Pakistani citizens – Muslims more than any other religious or ethnic group, denomination, or association – with impunity for years. As the entire nation supported the military offensive and prepared to attend to the needs of the tribesmen displaced from North Waziristan, more than a hundred Pakistani clerics from all different sects and denominations of Islam declared Operation Zarb-e-Azb to be a “jihad”, and issued “fatwa’s” that supporting the military operation was the religious duty and moral obligation of every conscientious Pakistani citizen.

While the kinetic military operation was launched in the “command center” of the terrorists (various locations in North Waziristan that were first bombed by air, and are now being cleared by ground forces), the entire nation has been put on security alert. Sensitive installations; important government buildings; military headquarters, command centers, logistics bases and forward operating bases; major roads, transport and communication links; critical infrastructure; and particularly airports are being heavily guarded by multiple rings of security perimeters. These preventive precautions are being taken in anticipation of retribution attacks by the TTP, or by their sleeper cells which are believed to be ensconced in major and medium-sized urban centers in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, Sindh and Baluch – and they are an addition to a nationwide intelligence alert concerning information-gathering and coordination protocols regarding terrorist communications and plots to carry out reprisal attacks in response to the North Waziristan operation. Search operations are also being carried out in Dera Ghazi Khan and Muzzaffargarh; areas in Punjab close to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as well as the FATA tribal agencies. The Punjab Police have heightened security throughout the province – especially on the M-2 motorway and GT Road – since the North Waziristan operation began, and since then, counter-terrorism operations are being carried out from time to time.

While the security of Pakistani airports has been increased manifold, an attack occurred on a plane landing at Peshawar airport, resulting in the death of one female passenger and injuries to two others. Increased security of other important infrastructure, such as railways, gas pipelines and electricity transmission units is also expected. Given the trends seen in past months, especially since the start of summer, this will be especially necessary in terms of continuation of the meager basic state services that are provided, and hopefully not disrupted (any more) by TTP terrorist activities (or by insurgent elements in Baluchistan). If gas supplies or electricity transmission to the citizenry is further disrupted – at a time when it is already being rationed and when the public has to face untenable “load-shedding” of gas and electricity supplies while the bills that they are being charged continue to increase – then the government will have to deal with public unrest as opposed to public support for the military that is engaged in a battle to secure the very existence of the Pakistani nation-state. Public unrest is also expected through political activities of opponent parties – such as the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), which is in power in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, and has promised a “tsunami march” on Islamabad which will take place on August 14; the country’s independence day – as well as other smaller sociopolitical organizations – such as the Minhaj-ul-Quran International (MQI) led by the Sufi cleric and scholar (albeit disputed because of his political activities) Allama Dr. Tahir ul Qadri, whose workers were targeted in a police operation in Lahore on the night of June 15 and during the daylight hours of June 16, resulting in the deaths of over a dozen MQI workers and injuries to many more (estimates range from a few dozen to over a hundred, while Dr. Qadri claims that dead bodies of his murdered workers have disappeared from the scene of the clashes and holds the police responsible for it).

It remains to be seen whether the latest wave of political instability – as is expected when the Islamic month of Ramadan ends and when the month of August begins – has any significant effect on the ongoing counter-terror operations in the tribal areas and throughout the country. Political destabilization in 2007 not only gave room for anti-state forces to coalesce and form the TTP as a potent militant organization; it also created the environment where an enemy inside the territorial confines of Pakistan became capable enough of posing the most dangerous threat to the country since it came to existence (or since 1971, as some “experts” would put it). Continued political instability during the most recent phase of democratic governance in Pakistan has both distracted the country’s governing politicians and has also demoralized them from making the hard decisions and disincentivized the tough choices that are required to effectively deter, counter and eliminate terrorist groups and localized criminal gangs that enjoy the support of these groups that operate nationwide. It is a sad state of affairs that despite the “rebirth” of democracy in Pakistan, the Parliament is not the main institution where political consensus is reached: leaders still make use of All Parties’ Conferences (APCs) to gather political forces both inside and outside Parliament to reach critical decisions on national issues that may or may not be implemented (primarily because they are extra-Parliamentary measures if not extra-Constitutional activities, and therefore have no legal basis and are not binding on the executive). The May 2013 elections (whose results are still contested a year on) returned the PML-N to power at the federal level with a simple majority – giving it more power than its predecessor PPP government, which relied on coalition partners for legislative success if not executive actions – but its decision-making capacity and capability has cast an ominous shadow over the Pakistani government’s efforts in bolstering and solidifying national security.

2013 was a transformative year for Pakistan as a whole: in addition to the general elections in May, the office of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) also changed hands, as did that of the President (and the Chief Justice of Pakistan). As such, the country had new political leadership, and a few months later, new military leadership as well. It was expected that the majority in the National Assembly would give the PML-N government much more power and ease in both making decisions and implementing them, but even when one considers the promises that the party made in its election manifesto, the federal government is lagging far behind in various – if not almost all – sectors of governance. It does not come as a surprise, then, when international news outlets claim that the aura of a balance in Pakistan’s civil-military relations is nothing more than a façade, and that the military continues to “call the shots” in terms of national security and internal security matters: the average Pakistani can at least find solace in the fact that the Pakistani military is the most effective institution in the country, and that even if the civilian government could not deliver on its promises for resolving the energy crisis or restoring investor confidence or controlling inflation or managing the external dimensions of the economy like trade and the valuation of the rupee, the state is taking the country’s security situation very seriously – and is taking steps at the appropriate time with the commensurate magnitude to resolve what are considered “existential threats” for Pakistan. In one year of performance, it clearly seems that the civilian government is facing more problems than it did before – or than its predecessor did in all of its five precarious years of existence. In the same time, the Pakistani military is performing better than all its previous years – and that while its performance has been improving on a year-by-year basis, the transition from 2013 to 2014 has registered significant improvement in all performance indicators of the military: combating terrorism in various theaters and environments, controlling both military and civilian deaths, enhancing coordination between the Army and the Air Force to develop a powerful “Air-Land” strategy that is effective in both counter-insurgency warfare as well as conventional warfare against an external enemy, and most importantly, the development of preventative measures and an effective defensive strategy that protects the civilian population by creating an intelligence-sharing mechanism that pre-empts terror attacks in a proactive manner.

The federal government – that is, the governing political party, the PML-N – appears to be more concerned with threats to its continuity, and its ability to fulfill its mandated five years of governance, than the threat(s) of life and death that the country and its people have been facing for a decade. The military, however, has become a powerful counter-insurgency force and is also undertaking kinetic as well as covert actions to disrupt, dismantle and destroy terrorists and their networks and strongholds/safe havens from Pakistan and disable anti-state elements from capitalizing on any power vacuum or security vacuum that exists anywhere in the country. Though the reasons for the MQI, and most importantly the PTI, undertaking political efforts to apparently dislodge the ruling party from power may or may not be questioned, the timing of their efforts – whether they are combined or undertaken separately – is a major cause for concern. When the nation should be united in combating the potent threat of terrorist militancy and developing ways and means to eliminate extremism and intolerance from all facets and dimensions of Pakistani society, the existence of a democratic setup is making room for political instability at a time when national security and public safety should be the top priority of all concerned (especially the leadership). However, if the representatives of the people – in government or in the opposition – can not or do not perform in accordance with the people’s wishes, and do not realize the importance of national priorities in the order that they exist and are presented to Pakistan today, then the people need to take charge. This does not mean forcing the existing government out of power, or creating public disorder, or starting a civil disobedience movement: not at all. In fact, this means that the people of Pakistan must realize the order and significance of national priorities and play their due role as dutiful and responsible citizens of the state. The difference between “general public” and an aware and conscientious “citizenry” must be realized, and the former must endeavour to do their best to transform themselves into the latter: the citizens of Pakistan need to support their security forces and establish an effective compact between state and society through which the differentiation between anti-state elements and elements loyal to the nation-state can be easily and efficaciously made.

The Pakistani nation needs to awaken and arise; whether it does so in the way that its current opposition leaders (inside and outside Parliament) are urging them to do so, or whether the nation becomes cognizant of its duties and responsibilities to the state and to each other – and understands the real priorities of the country in order to tackle them in the appropriate manner and order – is something that only time will tell… and it will invariably define how Pakistan will continue to exist as a nation-state in the coming years.

TACSTRAT ANALYSIS