At long last, the powerful Sword of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) is slashing through the strongholds of the (munifiqeen) in the tribal areas of the country: Operation Zarb-e-Azb has entered the second phase in North Waziristan, and ground forces have launched a kinetic counter-terrorism operation to surgically root out terrorists from this alleged “safe haven” which served as a launching pad for terrorists and extremists to conduct attacks in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan – but what are the priorities of the government and of the state? Are the people of Pakistan ready to become the active, conscientious citizenry that their country requires them to be; or will political instability continue to chip away at the foundations of Pakistan’s stability and national security?
Pakistan has been at war since 2004 – though the nation didn’t realize it then, because the “trickle down” effect of economic development was actually reaching the common man, and because terrorists were only targeting the country’s then-president, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Musharraf. It was only in 2007 when the country realized the daunting challenge that it was facing: terrorists and Islamic radicals had taken over a seminary in the federal capital of Islamabad, and had become a law unto themselves. A military operation was launched to secure the seminary (an abode for imparting Islamic studies, which had been taken over by terrorists in the pursuit of what they deemed was a “higher, purer purpose”) and while the militants were dislodged from this “base of operations” a few blocks away from the corridors of power, far away in the tribal areas, Al-Qaeda inspired militant groups coalesced to form the Pakistani Taliban, and vowed to take revenge from the Pakistani state and the military for what they deemed was an unforgivable act of sacrilege. As Islamic militants capitalized on the aftermath of the Lal Masjid siege and continuity of the country’s unstable political environment to the maximum extent possible, a bloody insurgency was launched by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – the Pakistani version of the Taliban who would overthrow the state in favour of sharia law and a decadent, ineffective and uniquely despicable form of government, as the Afghan Taliban did in 1994 – that has, till date, cost the lives of more than 50,000 Pakistanis, including over 10,000 security forces personnel (military, paramilitary, police, intelligence operatives, and others), and has exacted a toll of more than US$ 100 billion on the country’s economy in terms of destroyed infrastructure, capital flight because of those persons and families who wished to (and had the means to) escape the conflict and mayhem, and decreased investor and donor confidence in the country. The TTP declared the Federally Administered Tribal Areas to be under their control, with their leadership headquartered in North Waziristan, while they attempted to make inroads into the settled areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and to establish covert strongholds and deploy sleeper cells in the major cities of the country, such as Peshawar, Karachi, Lahore, and other smaller urban centers. At times, the TTP – their predecessor militias and their commanders, as well as their affiliates – entered into political agreements with the military or with the local tribal leadership to cease hostilities so that “peace” may return to conflict-ridden areas, so that Muslims would not be forced to kill their Muslim brothers, and most importantly, so that the Pakistani Taliban are an equivalent guarantor of this “peace” as much as the state or the military is.
The necessity of recognizing the TTP as a potent military force was not a willing choice – and the time gained during cessation of hostilities was not wasted by the Pakistani military at the very least: as the TTP broke the terms of their own ceasefire and blamed the state and military for it, all this time the Pakistan Army was transforming itself into one of the most powerful counter-insurgency forces in the world. Time and again, with or without a ceasefire agreement, whenever the TTP launched a massive terror offensive or attempted to gain control of an area, the Pakistan Army was called in – as Prime Minister Gilani stated when the military operation to retake the Swat valley was launched – to “restore the sanctity of our pure nation-state, uphold national integrity and pride, eliminate militants and militancy (from the concerned area) completely, and ensure the security and wellbeing of the people of Pakistan”. Military operations were launched in Bajaur, Mohmand, Kurram, Orakzai, Buner, Lower Dir, Shangla, the city of Swat in Malakand district, and even in South Waziristan. All these military operations successfully achieved their tactical objectives, but the strategic objective of eliminating terrorism from Pakistan was still not realized: partly because of civilian incapacity (both in the government side and from the civil society and general public), partly because the military had specific and particular goals (and did not want to infringe upon the domain of the civilian government, rightfully so or otherwise), and partly because the root causes of terrorism – extremism, intolerance, and rampant religious fundamentalism – were still not identified and no mechanism was created to deal with these problems that continue to pervade various dimensions of Pakistani society and way of life.
Until 2013, the activities of the Pakistan military were concentrated in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (through the paramilitary Frontier Corps, which has now become one of the best and most battle-hardened COIN forces in the region if not the world): after the PML-N government came into power, a low-intensity counter-terrorism operation was launched in Karachi with the paramilitary Rangers in the lead, and with the help of intelligence and counter-intelligence activities, to dislodge militant elements, sleeper cells and terrorist financiers from the metropolis and to restore peace, tranquility, security, and law and order in the country’s economic capital. This operation has come a long way, and with the increased strength of the Sindh police and other civilian law enforcement units (through training and active deployment in one of the most dangerous cities in the world) who are responsible for the security of Karachi in particular and the Sindh province as a whole, it is currently in its fourth or fifth stage as intelligence agencies have taken the lead in identifying and targeting anti-state elements in the city and coordinating efforts with law enforcement agencies to proactively prevent these miscreants from wreaking havoc and creating disorder in the financial hub of Pakistan. The exact nature, operational intensity, deployment of forces, methodology of threat assessment, mechanism for coordinating actionable intelligence, and response protocols for preventing (and responding to) acts of terror have not been fully revealed to the public – as the case should be, since announcing these specifics would be akin to giving the terrorists a “head start” and putting them two steps ahead of the law enforcement agencies, for the mere sake of “provision of information” by the “free media”. To reveal these sensitive state secrets that are of a contemporary nature and hold immense operational significance would not only be a crime, but it would be an unforgivable act of irresponsibility if it is done (and has been done) for the sake of ratings by news media outlets and TV channels. The TTP never announced which particular area it would bomb at which particular time using which particular method: but Pakistan’s news channels continuously made the grave mistake of announcing security operations days if not hours in advance, giving militants and anti-state forces a chance to retreat or initiate countermeasures.
Thankfully, the government and state – and especially the military – has learned fully from these antics of the country’s newborn electronic media (which is free but reckless and irresponsible), and as the PML-N government vowed to negotiate a peace settlement with the TTP since late 2013, the Pakistan military carefully fine-tuned and adopted its “talk-fight” approach and prepared itself for every eventuality: including that of the talks failing, which was bound to happen if recent history provides any measure of what a treaty or agreement means to the militants. The negotiations process started slowly and through intermediaries: very successfully, the media’s full attention – if not that of the entire nation – was directed onto the talks between the TTP’s and govermments’ negotiators committees. Despite the death of TTP leader Hakeemullah Mehsud in a drone attack in early November 2013, the talks process continued even though TTP commanders vowed to exact vengeance for “every drop of Hakeemullah’s blood that had been spilt”. An IED exploded in a rented van which was preparing to transport paramilitary FC personnel to Miram Shah base in North Waziristan: what was a routine operation soon became the center of attention and the focus of the nation’s (and the military’s) anger, because the state had been observing a ceasefire while the TTP continued to carry out attacks against military and civilian targets. Earlier, a senior Army commander, Major General Sanaullah Khan Niazi, was martyred along with an officer and soldier of the Pakistan Army while the talks process was ongoing: the nation and the military let the fire of rage burn inside them as they continued to support the civilian government’s attempt to “give peace a chance” by means of negotiation and dialogue.
The military had learned much more than the virtues of patience, the importance of unity as expressed through improved civil-military relations, and the effectiveness of counter-insurgency tactics and strategy in various terrains: the significant impact of air operations, and of using airborne weapons platforms to dominate the battlefield on the ground, was also operationalized and improved as 2014 began. For every action, there was an equal and opposite reaction: since the TTP was a loose grouping of militants and militant organizations who had coalesced under a common anti-state banner for their own personal benefit and operational consolidation, the leadership said it was in favour of peace talks as different subordinate “units” of the TTP (ostensibly against any form of negotiated peace) continued to attack Pakistan. For these dastardly actions, the Pakistan Army – through its Air Defence wing – and the Pakistan Air Force pounded terrorist hideouts and targeted its scattered leadership and cadres every time they attacked the citizens of Pakistan or the security forces. The military – and through the media, the general public – had also learned of the deepening of cracks and fissures within the TTP over the issue of negotiating with the Pakistani state (and more importantly, over the issue of leadership and devolution of command to regional commanders). Infighting had broken out among TTP cadres in South Waziristan, as the Khaled Mehsud (aka Khan Said Sajna) group battled the forces of Shehryar Mehsud. The former was slated to become TTP chief after the death of Hakimullah Mehsud in November 2013, but was passed over for the incapable and ineffective Mullah Fazlullah, while the latter had taken control of the meager forces which were loyal to Hakeemullah Mehsud (and therefore wished to fight against Pakistan and take revenge, rather than negotiate with it). Fazlullah tried to play his role as the TTP leader and end the infighting among his commanders, but ended up making a grave mistake which could not be undone. He announced that he had removed Sajna from his position of commander of TTP in South Waziristan, and appointed and interim leader for the time that the TTP “shura” would take to appoint a new leader for the tribal agency. By the end of May 2014, Sajna effectively broke off ties with the TTP, its head Mullah Fazlullah, and its leadership council or “shura”: he formed his own “TTP South Waziristan”, and took much of the Mehsud tribal militants (the core of the TTP’s fighting force in FATA) and the Punjabi Taliban (militants of banned outfits like LeJ, SSP, JeM, etc.). Sajna was also known to have much better ties with the Haqqani network and the Afghan Taliban than the TTP did – the latter professed fealty to Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar, while they barely followed any of his commands and edicts, and the Afghan Taliban as well as Mullah Omar neither acknowledged the TTP nor claimed to have any operational links or ties with the Pakistani Taliban. In one fell swoop, Khan Said Sajna destroyed the fledgling control of the TTP that Fazlullah was trying to consolidate ever since he was appointed as the central leader of the TTP: since Fazlullah belonged to Swat and not to the tribal areas, he was neither fully recognized nor welcome in the areas where the TTP actually had control on the ground, and the TTP leadership council (the “shura”) comprising of main TTP commanders was also unhappy with Fazlullah’s leadership style (they claimed that Fazlullah operated in a dictatorial fashion and issued decrees, rather than giving due importance to the “shura” and engaging in consultations over important issues before issuing or announcing the decision of the TTP leadership – as opposed to that of the TTP’s leader). It was exactly this manner of “commanding” the TTP whereby Fazlullah made the deadly mistake of removing Sajna first, and then asking the “shura” to validate his decision and appoint a new commander for South Waziristan afterwards – akin to killing his only cow and later remembering that he had run out of milk to spill and cry about.
The TTP infighting that started in South Waziristan spread to the forested Shawal valley of North Waziristan, and dozens of TTP cadres were being killed daily in these internecine gunfights and pitched battles. And as early as February/March 2014, elements of the Pakistan Army (including mountain warfare specialists, guerilla tacticians, SSG commandos, infantry personnel, and – as the success of the aerial offensive of Operation Zarb-e-Azb would show – members of the elite Pakistan Air Forces commandos, or SSG-A, who have expertise in laser targeting for guidance of precision munitions and are trained as ground combat controllers) were inserted into North Waziristan to conduct what the military calls “minor ops”. As part of its new war-fighting doctrine, the Pakistan Army trains its officers and soldiers to conduct “minor ops” alongside major operations and coordinated offensives – while the latter are carefully designed and calibrated at the Army-level, the Corps-level, the regiment-level and the battalion-level, “minor ops” can be carried out at the platoon-level or even at the unit-level. “Minor ops” are designed to attack the enemy from the rear, to carry out attrition warfare and to continually harass the enemy in order to lower their morale, keep them disoriented, and maintain an imbalance in the forward-operating forces of the enemy so that a major operation has greater chance of succeeding and meets little to no resistance from the battered and bruised opposition that it will meet at the enemy’s first line of defense. As far as the “minor ops” against the TTP and their allied militants in FATA go, such operations would include: short, swift, unexpected gun battles that would eliminate TTP leaders and their security details; creating confusion within TTP cadres and among TTP groups, and overall dissension in the ranks of the militant umbrella organization and their subordinate militias; exacerbating existing rifts between militant commanders and creating new sources of tension and acrimony whenever the chance presents itself; locating, identifying and “softening” the hardened targets, such as militant command centers and facilities, fortified and makeshift bunkers to repulse attacks from conventional military forces, and storage facilities for weapons stockpiling and manufacturing of bombs and IEDs, in advance of a military operation that would completely wipe out the TTP from their “command base”. As it happens, these elite units also performed two very important additional tasks in the months before the formal launch of Operation Zarb-e-Azb: they identified important targets for the military that needed to be destroyed and devised area-wise perimeters in a way that tribesmen and civilians would be able to peruse safe passage out of the warzone while the militants would be locked in a tight “noose” that would surround these important targets (those militants who tried to escape would be shot down by snipers, while those who wait for their ration stockpiles to run out would also be sitting ducks for PAF airstrikes, gunship helicopter attacks and artillery bombardment). The second important task was the coordination and guidance of precise munitions used by the Army and Air Force for bombing militant concentrations, important militant facilities, command centers and weapons depots used by militants, and other compounds used for housing foreign militants or for training suicide bombers: to guide the precision munitions of the two arms of the military, the crack units deployed in advance would not only have training, but would also have the equipment to guide bombs, missiles, gunship helicopters, and artillery to their precise targets – thus taking out the militants with full force, wrath and fury that the nation and the military had kept under control for months if not years, and avoiding any form of collateral damage in which tribesmen and their families would become victims of the bombing runs by the Army and Air Force.
On June 15, 2014, the ISPR announced that Operation Zarb-e-Azb had been launched to cleanse North Waziristan of TTP militants and foreigners whom the TTP had been training and sheltering. A few days earlier, in what is considered the casus belli for launching the operation, the Jinnah International Airport in Karachi was attacked by militants who intended to take control of the airport and create a hostage situation, in addition to disrupting regular flights and trying to expose the weaknesses of Pakistan’s security forces in defending critical infrastructure. As soon as the attack was launched, all elements of the security forces – including elite SSG commandos – were brought into the equation, and an operation to retake the airport and kill or capture the terrorists was initiated. The retaliatory operation ended successfully within a matter of hours: certain news media outlets claimed that the terrorists who attacked the airport were foreigners, and appeared to be Uzbeks. For a long time, the TTP has been harbouring foreign militants and has been providing them with safe haven, training, and has been coordinating with them operationally in different theaters of war and against different enemies: the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) are some of the main foreign militant groups that were allied with the TTP if not the Afghan Taliban, and the TTP routinely deployed cadres of these militant groups to launch attacks in Pakistan.
The attack on the Karachi airport forced the military to put its foot down: despite what many believe are cozy civil-military relations in Pakistan, where the civilian government and the military leadership are “on the same page” (whereas, in a potent democracy, the civilian leadership commands the military and has the final say in authorizing or forbidding any kind of military action), this time it was the ISPR – as opposed to the President of Pakistan, who is Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, or the Prime Minister, the powerful chief executive who issued the orders for the operation in Swat when Yousaf Raza Gilani held the office – which announced that a military operation in North Waziristan is being (read: has been) launched, and the operation has been codenamed “Zarb-e-Azb”, which means a sharp slash of Al-Azb, the sword that the Holy Prophet (PBUH) used in his battles against the infidels. Whether the military shot first and the civilian government asked questions later, or not, is an issue for the historians to decide: but the announcement of the launch of operation(s) in North Waziristan was a welcome initiative in many aspects. For years, the U.S. had been calling for a military operation in the volatile tribal agency that had become the hub of militant activities (and since the TTP controlled most parts of it, it allowed the Afghan Taliban and the dreaded Haqqani network a stepping stone on the Afghan border to launch attacks against NATO forces and Afghan troops deep within Afghanistan – a deadly reversal of the “strategic depth” phenomenon which favoured militant groups at the expense of the Afghan and Pakistani states). An operation in North Waziristan was on the top of the American “do more” list, in terms of things that Pakistan needed to do in order to eliminate terrorism and militancy (and perhaps extremism too) from the region – according to the U.S. perspective. Interestingly, a senior U.S. diplomat visited Pakistan in mid-May and asked the country to launch an operation in North Waziristan before the second “run-off” phase of the Afghan presidential election, and reports about the request vary: some say the diplomat asked for the operation to be finished successfully before the Afghans go to the poll for the second time. The run-off election between contestants Abdullah Abdullah – the frontrunner who lost and blamed his defeat on poll-rigging – and Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai – the underdog who received double the amount of votes that he did in the first phase, thereby getting six percent more than the required 50% to be elected Afghan president – took place on June 14: the ISPR announced the launch of the operation the next day. The operation’s codename also makes important references to sacred religious articles, thereby appealing to the beliefs and base instincts (if not reason and rationale) of conservative Muslims in Pakistan: that the TTP are the infidels and (munafiqeen) who cannot be trusted, who have broken their pledges and commitments, and who cannot be negotiated with, while the soldiers and officers of the Pakistan Armed Forces are the true “mujahideen” who have launched a decisive “jihad” against these anti-state elements who had been killing Pakistani citizens – Muslims more than any other religious or ethnic group, denomination, or association – with impunity for years. As the entire nation supported the military offensive and prepared to attend to the needs of the tribesmen displaced from North Waziristan, more than a hundred Pakistani clerics from all different sects and denominations of Islam declared Operation Zarb-e-Azb to be a “jihad”, and issued “fatwa’s” that supporting the military operation was the religious duty and moral obligation of every conscientious Pakistani citizen.
While the kinetic military operation was launched in the “command center” of the terrorists (various locations in North Waziristan that were first bombed by air, and are now being cleared by ground forces), the entire nation has been put on security alert. Sensitive installations; important government buildings; military headquarters, command centers, logistics bases and forward operating bases; major roads, transport and communication links; critical infrastructure; and particularly airports are being heavily guarded by multiple rings of security perimeters. These preventive precautions are being taken in anticipation of retribution attacks by the TTP, or by their sleeper cells which are believed to be ensconced in major and medium-sized urban centers in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, Sindh and Baluch – and they are an addition to a nationwide intelligence alert concerning information-gathering and coordination protocols regarding terrorist communications and plots to carry out reprisal attacks in response to the North Waziristan operation. Search operations are also being carried out in Dera Ghazi Khan and Muzzaffargarh; areas in Punjab close to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as well as the FATA tribal agencies. The Punjab Police have heightened security throughout the province – especially on the M-2 motorway and GT Road – since the North Waziristan operation began, and since then, counter-terrorism operations are being carried out from time to time.
While the security of Pakistani airports has been increased manifold, an attack occurred on a plane landing at Peshawar airport, resulting in the death of one female passenger and injuries to two others. Increased security of other important infrastructure, such as railways, gas pipelines and electricity transmission units is also expected. Given the trends seen in past months, especially since the start of summer, this will be especially necessary in terms of continuation of the meager basic state services that are provided, and hopefully not disrupted (any more) by TTP terrorist activities (or by insurgent elements in Baluchistan). If gas supplies or electricity transmission to the citizenry is further disrupted – at a time when it is already being rationed and when the public has to face untenable “load-shedding” of gas and electricity supplies while the bills that they are being charged continue to increase – then the government will have to deal with public unrest as opposed to public support for the military that is engaged in a battle to secure the very existence of the Pakistani nation-state. Public unrest is also expected through political activities of opponent parties – such as the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), which is in power in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, and has promised a “tsunami march” on Islamabad which will take place on August 14; the country’s independence day – as well as other smaller sociopolitical organizations – such as the Minhaj-ul-Quran International (MQI) led by the Sufi cleric and scholar (albeit disputed because of his political activities) Allama Dr. Tahir ul Qadri, whose workers were targeted in a police operation in Lahore on the night of June 15 and during the daylight hours of June 16, resulting in the deaths of over a dozen MQI workers and injuries to many more (estimates range from a few dozen to over a hundred, while Dr. Qadri claims that dead bodies of his murdered workers have disappeared from the scene of the clashes and holds the police responsible for it).
It remains to be seen whether the latest wave of political instability – as is expected when the Islamic month of Ramadan ends and when the month of August begins – has any significant effect on the ongoing counter-terror operations in the tribal areas and throughout the country. Political destabilization in 2007 not only gave room for anti-state forces to coalesce and form the TTP as a potent militant organization; it also created the environment where an enemy inside the territorial confines of Pakistan became capable enough of posing the most dangerous threat to the country since it came to existence (or since 1971, as some “experts” would put it). Continued political instability during the most recent phase of democratic governance in Pakistan has both distracted the country’s governing politicians and has also demoralized them from making the hard decisions and disincentivized the tough choices that are required to effectively deter, counter and eliminate terrorist groups and localized criminal gangs that enjoy the support of these groups that operate nationwide. It is a sad state of affairs that despite the “rebirth” of democracy in Pakistan, the Parliament is not the main institution where political consensus is reached: leaders still make use of All Parties’ Conferences (APCs) to gather political forces both inside and outside Parliament to reach critical decisions on national issues that may or may not be implemented (primarily because they are extra-Parliamentary measures if not extra-Constitutional activities, and therefore have no legal basis and are not binding on the executive). The May 2013 elections (whose results are still contested a year on) returned the PML-N to power at the federal level with a simple majority – giving it more power than its predecessor PPP government, which relied on coalition partners for legislative success if not executive actions – but its decision-making capacity and capability has cast an ominous shadow over the Pakistani government’s efforts in bolstering and solidifying national security.
2013 was a transformative year for Pakistan as a whole: in addition to the general elections in May, the office of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) also changed hands, as did that of the President (and the Chief Justice of Pakistan). As such, the country had new political leadership, and a few months later, new military leadership as well. It was expected that the majority in the National Assembly would give the PML-N government much more power and ease in both making decisions and implementing them, but even when one considers the promises that the party made in its election manifesto, the federal government is lagging far behind in various – if not almost all – sectors of governance. It does not come as a surprise, then, when international news outlets claim that the aura of a balance in Pakistan’s civil-military relations is nothing more than a façade, and that the military continues to “call the shots” in terms of national security and internal security matters: the average Pakistani can at least find solace in the fact that the Pakistani military is the most effective institution in the country, and that even if the civilian government could not deliver on its promises for resolving the energy crisis or restoring investor confidence or controlling inflation or managing the external dimensions of the economy like trade and the valuation of the rupee, the state is taking the country’s security situation very seriously – and is taking steps at the appropriate time with the commensurate magnitude to resolve what are considered “existential threats” for Pakistan. In one year of performance, it clearly seems that the civilian government is facing more problems than it did before – or than its predecessor did in all of its five precarious years of existence. In the same time, the Pakistani military is performing better than all its previous years – and that while its performance has been improving on a year-by-year basis, the transition from 2013 to 2014 has registered significant improvement in all performance indicators of the military: combating terrorism in various theaters and environments, controlling both military and civilian deaths, enhancing coordination between the Army and the Air Force to develop a powerful “Air-Land” strategy that is effective in both counter-insurgency warfare as well as conventional warfare against an external enemy, and most importantly, the development of preventative measures and an effective defensive strategy that protects the civilian population by creating an intelligence-sharing mechanism that pre-empts terror attacks in a proactive manner.
The federal government – that is, the governing political party, the PML-N – appears to be more concerned with threats to its continuity, and its ability to fulfill its mandated five years of governance, than the threat(s) of life and death that the country and its people have been facing for a decade. The military, however, has become a powerful counter-insurgency force and is also undertaking kinetic as well as covert actions to disrupt, dismantle and destroy terrorists and their networks and strongholds/safe havens from Pakistan and disable anti-state elements from capitalizing on any power vacuum or security vacuum that exists anywhere in the country. Though the reasons for the MQI, and most importantly the PTI, undertaking political efforts to apparently dislodge the ruling party from power may or may not be questioned, the timing of their efforts – whether they are combined or undertaken separately – is a major cause for concern. When the nation should be united in combating the potent threat of terrorist militancy and developing ways and means to eliminate extremism and intolerance from all facets and dimensions of Pakistani society, the existence of a democratic setup is making room for political instability at a time when national security and public safety should be the top priority of all concerned (especially the leadership). However, if the representatives of the people – in government or in the opposition – can not or do not perform in accordance with the people’s wishes, and do not realize the importance of national priorities in the order that they exist and are presented to Pakistan today, then the people need to take charge. This does not mean forcing the existing government out of power, or creating public disorder, or starting a civil disobedience movement: not at all. In fact, this means that the people of Pakistan must realize the order and significance of national priorities and play their due role as dutiful and responsible citizens of the state. The difference between “general public” and an aware and conscientious “citizenry” must be realized, and the former must endeavour to do their best to transform themselves into the latter: the citizens of Pakistan need to support their security forces and establish an effective compact between state and society through which the differentiation between anti-state elements and elements loyal to the nation-state can be easily and efficaciously made.
The Pakistani nation needs to awaken and arise; whether it does so in the way that its current opposition leaders (inside and outside Parliament) are urging them to do so, or whether the nation becomes cognizant of its duties and responsibilities to the state and to each other – and understands the real priorities of the country in order to tackle them in the appropriate manner and order – is something that only time will tell… and it will invariably define how Pakistan will continue to exist as a nation-state in the coming years.
By ZoneAsia-Pk