Beyond the ‘Revolution’

Tacstrat Analysis

From recounting in four constituencies to an overhaul of the whole system beginning with the resignation of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, our ‘revolutionaries’ seem to have come full circle to 2008. After the recent disclosure by a government official about the recent offer by the military to help the government out of the political mess in Islamabad in return for it not encroaching on the state’s foreign and security policy, one theory out there is that the backers of the ‘independence’ and ‘revolution’ marches could indeed be the security managers of the country, i.e., the military and the intelligence agencies.

It is no secret that the Pakistan Army and its intelligence agencies, by and large, have a hold over the country’s security and foreign policy. The Nawaz Sharif government’s attempt at trying to undo that arrangement, even if it came in the form of a draft of a tentative National Security Policy 2014-2018 in the parliament, might have unnerved the military.

The major point of contention in the draft is the emphasis the government has or had given to reconciliation or dialogue with the militants as opposed to the military’s desire to launch an operation against anti-state militants, in response to the burgeoning amount of terrorist attacks in the country. This was indeed seen with the continuous efforts at talks, by the government and the opposition, particularly, the PTI and the religious parties. Eventually, however, amidst failed talks, that were deemed pointless in some quarters; Operation Zarb-e-Azb was launched in July.

Another conjecture, appears to be the military’s strenuous relationship with the PMLN government, might entail a trust deficit particularly with regards to managing the state in the aftermath of Zarb e Azb. After all, why put so much effort in cleansing a whole region of enemy combatants and partially risk future strategic partnerships with those who have been doing the state’s bidding in the past, when, according to you, those running the show at home seem to be fully capable of messing everything at home and undoing the effort.

Talking about strategic partnerships, Afghanistan may answer part of the puzzle on the foreign policy front. With the drawdown in December this year, Nawaz Sharif’s ouster in Islamabad would mean setting back the diplomatic overtures made to Afghanistan on counter-terrorism collaboration, not that anything was achieved in the recent counter-terrorism talks between the intelligence officials on both sides. From the never-ending Afghan accusations at Pakistan to ongoing attacks being allegedly launched from both sides of the border against each other. It could be that the ruling party could not have been trusted at leveraging a ‘Pro-Pakistan’ post-2014 dispensation in Afghanistan.

Then, there’s India, the cancelling of the talks between the two foreign secretaries and the ongoing cross-border shelling and alleged ceasefire ‘violations’. Back-door channeling, promised by the PM’s of both the countries is gradually taking a back seat, with the present stalemate likely to be the least bad outcome for the medium-term. Lack of progress with New Delhi raises fear for Pakistan’s security apparatus with regards to the former’s future role in Afghanistan, something that is seen as inimical to Pakistan’s internal and external security interests. The ruling government, with its peace efforts, could have been seen as being dismissive of Pakistan’s security challenges in this regard.

It would be too premature to conclude the above conjecture as definite, for now. However, what seems clear is that the military as a whole is apprehensive of the government trying it to rein it in and would do everything it can to retain control over Pakistan’s foreign and security policy, something that it deems essential for the very survival of the state. The ruling government, on its own, is being called out as partially responsible for its own weakened state. One only needs to count all of those with the surname ‘Butt’ who have gained fame in the recent weeks to prove this notion right. Any foreseeable agreement between the government and the ‘revolutionaries’ has to be seen in the broader context of the institutional power politics that could be playing out. At the end of it all, it will be the change or lack of in the share of power between the different institutions that could really tell us about what this ‘revolution’ was in essence.