After the underdog Ashraf Ghani emerges as President-elect of Afghanistan with 56% of the vote in a ballot whose result is contested by Abdullah Abdullah, who won the most number of votes in the first stage of the election. Will Ghani succeed where Karzai failed, and cobble up a coalition that includes opponents and critics, from the insurgents to political adversaries, including Abdullah Abdullah himself? Or is the latest twist in the tale of the Afghan state going to add to problems? The Taliban are gearing up for the “fighting season” in a year when most NATO troops will withdraw, and Pakistan is conducting counter-terror operations in North Waziristan: will Afghan politics undo all the work that has been done – and is still being done – so far to stabilize the region?
The current political crisis in Afghanistan is not a good omen. It does not bode well for Afghanistan’s security or its future: and it will have negative repercussions for the stability of the entire region.
The main issue that gives credence to the charges of rigging and electoral tampering are the results of first round of balloting held on April 05 – Abdullah Abdullah (who also contested the 2009 presidential election, and is the candidate of the National Coalition of Afghanistan) got more votes than Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai: the former had 45% of the vote while the latter had 31.5%! How did number two jump to number one in the second round (or run-off) held on June 14, where the leader from the first phase was expected to get more votes and consolidate his lead (which was only a few percentage points away from the required 50% of the vote)? Is it really possible that Ashraf Ghani got more than double the votes that he did in the first phase of the election (2,084,547 votes in the first round and 4,485,888 in the second, ending up with 56.44% of the vote) – and on top of that, is it believable that he was lagging at least ten percentage points behind Abdullah Abdullah, and then managed to close in the gap and exceed it within a matter of weeks? Abdullah Abdullah (who got 2,972,141 votes in the first round and 3,461,639 in the second: an increase of 16%, but bringing down his overall lead from 45% to 43.56%) had been campaigning against the election rigging ever since the first round ended, and protests are already taking place in different cities of Afghanistan; he had given proof in mid-June that the Afghan IEC was “colluding” with Ghani and his team, and were using illegal methods to obtain a result favourable for Ghani. He rejected the results of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) well before they were announced on July 07 (delayed from their original date of announcement on July 02), and continues to boycott the election process until his allegations are taken seriously and the real results of the election are announced. Abdullah Abdullah’s main allegation is that “ballot-stuffing” – filling ballot boxes with illegal votes that would eventually be counted and considered legitimate – has resulted in the victory of his opponent. The final result of the 2014 presidential election is expected to be announced on July 22.
“Ballot-stuffing” is among the main reasons (along with electoral fraud and intimidation) that made the 2009 presidential election controversial: heavy U.S. pressure resulted in the announcement of a second round, but the main contestant at that time (Abdullah Abdullah) declined to participate, resulting in President Hamid Karzai winning a second term in office. Mr. Abdullah was a former Foreign Minister of Afghanistan under the Karzai regime, and Mr. Ghani also served as Finance Minister under President Karzai. Most of the presidential contenders in 2014 had served in the Karzai cabinet or in the post-2001 Afghan state in different positions. Even in 2009, Mr. Abdullah called for the resignation of the IEC chief; his demand was rejected by the incumbent President, Hamid Karzai. Mr. Abdullah’s refusal to participate in the scheduled second run-off led to the cancellation of the second round and the declaration of Karzai as the winner of the election. It is unlikely that Mr. Abdullah would bow out this time again, leading to a more prolonged political crisis than what was witnessed five years ago (he recently told a crowd of supporters chanting “death to Ashraf Ghani” that “we will not accept a fraudulent result – not today, not tomorrow, never”). And since the Afghan people are already out on the streets demanding transparency and accurate counting of legitimate votes, it is also unlikely that the Election Complaints Commission (backed by the UN in 2009) will deliver timely verdicts that would please Mr. Abdullah this time around. In 2009, under intense pressure from the U.S. (which wanted to show that together, Mr. Karzai and Mr. Abdullah won 70% of the vote, making a consensus government in which they both shared power a legitimate one that represented a majority of the Afghan electorate) both candidates refused to discuss power sharing with other contestants or declare the results to be valid before they were announced (and/or a winner was declared). U.S. diplomat Peter Galbraith – who openly accused his superior, UN representative Kai Eide, of covering up massive electoral fraud in favour of Karzai – called the 2009 Afghan presidential elections a “train wreck”, stating that in his estimate, more than 30% of votes cast for Karzai were “fraudulent”.
The impact of the current political crisis on security operations is immense and will continue to increase: one must not forget how difficult it was to secure the initial elections phase, held in a single countrywide ballot on April 05.
The 2009 Afghan presidential election, as well as the results of the elections held this year, speak for themselves: how can such a huge statistical anomaly be relegated to the ranks of a real but inexplicable phenomenon? It is either real, and then should be explainable, or it is a manipulated outcome, and must therefore be cleansed and made more transparent. The future of Afghanistan, and the stability of the region, is at stake.
Of particular importance is Pakistan’s operation in North Waziristan: in addition to targeting TTP militants and foreign fighters (Uzbeks, Chechens, Uighurs, and others) the Pakistani military is also going against the Haqqani network, which had long been presumed to have been enjoying Pakistani protection and patronage, and which has been the main force of the Taliban insurgency since 2005. Since June, Pak-Afghan diplomacy and military relations appear to be improving, at least in terms of frequency of contact.
But the value added by recent diplomatic efforts in terms of securing both Pakistan and Afghanistan – disrupting and dismantling terrorist networks, including their leadership, and eliminating terrorist groups and anti-state forces from a position of strength – will only be seen for its true contribution after the current military operation in Pakistan is over.
Pakistan has already initiated a nationwide security alert, and the security at airports and other sensitive and important places has been heightened. Search operations take place in different settled areas of the country, including Karachi, to flush out TTP operatives who have fled, or sleeper cells who might organize and carry out reprisal attacks deep within Pakistan. As Pakistan is already host to a large number of Afghan immigrants – many of whom were to migrate back to their home country this year after decades of staying in Pakistan – the current military operation in the area bordering Afghanistan, along with the Afghan political crisis (that may affect the country’s security and ongoing fight against the Taliban in a negative way) would lead many Afghans to consider that another period of unrest, civil war, ethnic tensions and internecine infighting is soon to follow: it may result in a Taliban “re-takeover” or would lead to continued conflict between the state and insurgent elements.
According to news reports (and claims by the Abdullah campaign), U.S. President Barack Obama phoned Abdullah Abdullah to “calm down ragged nerves” on July 07 and then called Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai on July 08. He called for a thorough review of allegations of electoral fraud: while the U.S. President said that the results were not final, he also “warned” Abdullah Abdullah against declaring victory before the final results were announced, or to make attempts for a “power grab”. Should it be considered direct American intervention in Afghanistan’s sovereign affairs, and continuing intervention at that (given the scenario that occurred in 2009)? The White House said that the U.S. President was also “threatening” to cut off U.S. aid to Afghanistan if “violent or extra-constitutional” means are used to take power or to disrupt the political process. Gopal Ratnam and Eltaf Najafizada, writing for “Bloomberg”, say that the U.S. risks being blamed for taking sides if it involves itself further in the Afghan election process: particularly if it increases its involvement to the levels of 2009.
The Afghan state is flawed. The abovementioned arguments leave no doubt about that – and even if it isn’t flawed, wishful thinking requires some verification from facts on the ground. These ground realities reveal that the Taliban are making moves to take over the Sangin area in Helmand province, and holding their positions despite repeated counter-attacks from Afghan security forces since mid-June. The state, when measured in terms of its political sustainability, legitimacy, viability, and capability of securing itself and establishing its writ, is crumbling fast if it has not completely failed yet.
In the dying days of his second term of office, President Karzai still wishes to manipulate the state’s processes and maximize his existing political capital by pulling the strings: thereby making the current electoral process as controversial as the elections of 2009. Nothing can be done if the Afghan government – or if Afghans themselves – are bent on sabotaging their own political process(es).
The process itself is flawed too. The Afghan IEC isn’t really independent: it depends on the Afghan president and the incumbent government for its human resource and finances more so than the Afghan parliament or an independent state institution like the judiciary (which, again, is an extension of the executive branch rather than being a separate arm of the state). The trichotomy of powers is non-existent in how the Afghan state operates, and the executive – particularly the President – holds almost absolute power when it comes to developing and implementing national policies.
As such, the will of the Afghan people may be represented through a democratic process that is limited and has not developed enough to account holistically for the will of the Afghan people expressed through voting and exercising public franchise. It is not even certain to what extent the existing state apparatus recognizes the local culture, customs, and traditional tribal leadership of Afghan communities – and whether they are given official status in the process of exercising decision-making power, or not. In turn, this means that the real representation of the democratic mandate of any Afghan president – whether he comes to power through a transparent and legitimate process or not, and regardless of how much power or influence he is able to exercise – is limited itself. Marginalized communities and ethnic groups will continue to feel ignored, neglected and deprived of their role in society; similarly, marginalized power bases will continue their struggle against the status quo and against a sociopolitical order that does not recognize them or serve their purpose.
What is the end result? Afghanistan is still unstable, its state and political processes – particularly the effort of managing the exercise of public franchise to choose their leadership – are unreliable and still have not matured yet. International forces are already pulling out, and will withdraw by the end of this year. The U.S. is planning to keep approximately ten thousand (9,600 to be exact) troops in Afghanistan (to be pulled out by 2017 in favour of a more nominal number) of “military advisers” who will train Afghan troops and policemen, rather than be involved in operations themselves. Both candidates were in favour of the U.S.-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) that had been voted for by the Afghan parliament, and which governs the legal status of U.S. troops stationed in Afghanistan. While President Karzai refused to assent to the law, the BSA would have been inked no matter which of the candidates won: and by appearances, Ashraf Ghani would sign it into law as a priority agenda item, since he was involved in the negotiations that resulted in the BSA in its current form and language.
But the doors of regional intervention in Afghanistan remain open: hence, Afghan stability remains dependent on the foreign policy configurations of Pakistan, India, Iran, Central Asian states, and even China and Russia, who intend to play a more assertive role in Asia (especially through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, or SCO). An Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process is futile if one of the main contenders challenges the very foundations of the Afghan-managed and Afghan-run presidential election process. Peace in Afghanistan – especially peace once foreign troops exit – will only come about through a national coalition government that is truly representative of all shades of public opinion (and all power centers and configurations, including insurgent forces) and that can effectively deliver essential services to the Afghan people. If the Taliban and other nationalist insurgent forces are not on the negotiating table, then all attempts at securing Afghanistan through political dialogue are meaningless. Compared to Pakistan, political dialogue in the truest and most real sense will deliver more sustainable results for Afghanistan than a military operation against Taliban insurgents: the TTP insurgency – which pledges fealty to Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar – was relatively new, and did not recognize the Pakistani Constitution, so attempts to negotiate even a lasting ceasefire were futile, and only counter-insurgency operations could actually dislodge the TTP from holding tribal or settled areas, as the Pakistani military has proved time and again since 2008. It is also important for Afghanistan to force effective military coordination mechanisms and systems with Pakistan so that the joint threat of Taliban militancy can be countered together and either eliminated, or transformed into mainstream political activity that does not threaten public security or defy the writ of the state.
At the same time, too much involvement in Afghanistan’s internal affairs – and that too, in a direct and overt fashion – will be severely disliked by the Afghan populace. Afghan citizens routinely take out anti-Pakistan rallies (obviously encouraged by the Afghan state, the Karzai regime, and the intelligence establishment run by the NDS) to lambast the country’s support in the creation of the Taliban and their rise to power from 1994 to 2001: at times, the rallies are used to raise allegations about Pakistan’s continued financial and operational support to the Taliban, which has been fighting U.S.-led NATO-ISAF forces as well as the Afghan security forces since 2005. As India intends to enlarge its footprint in Afghanistan (after signing a Strategic pact with the Karzai government) while the U.S. intends to prolong its own footprint in the landlocked, mineral-rich country, other regional and global powers will definitely find ways and means to further their interests in the Central and South Asian regions that are connected to each other by Afghanistan. The Persian Gulf is also a region that would be directly affected by an upsurge in the Afghan conflict: Iran borders Afghanistan to the south, and is already concerned about the rise of the “Islamic State” in Iraq and Syria (the acquisition by this radical transnational militant group of weapons, power, territory, oil fields, and their establishment of a “caliphate” in the areas that they continue to control). The Taliban themselves have taken up arms against the fact that foreign troops composed of the U.S. and NATO countries are enforcing security in Afghanistan: the Taliban narrative calls the International Security Assistance Forces “occupiers” and “invaders” in the presence of whom peace can never be restored in Afghanistan.
Countries in the region – and around the world – need to get involved in order to sooth nerves in the Afghan political spectrum, especially because the very stability and future security of Afghanistan (particularly the Afghan state) depends on it. The efforts of Afghanistan’s neighbours and the international community at forging out a consensus Afghan government that is stable and that represents the will of the Afghan people through a transparent electoral process must be designed to encourage Afghanistan at improving its own systems, rather than enforcing decisions or dictating terms to the incumbent Afghan administration. But Afghans themselves need to realize that they must come together and achieve a political consensus that reaches out to all parties, religious groups, ethnicities and associations in all provinces.
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